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THERE AND BACK, NOW AND THEN:  IIRIRA’S 
RETROACTIVITY AND THE NORMALIZATION 
OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN IMMIGRATION LAW 
Austen Ishii* 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court has a long tradition of treating immigration law 
as “exceptional,” deferring to Congress and executive agencies when 
determining the scope of various immigration laws.  The Court’s refusal to 
subject immigration statutes to the ordinary level of judicial review has left 
immigrants even more susceptible to the effects of anti-immigrant 
legislation. 
When the Court decided Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales in 2006 it 
increased the scope of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) by allowing portions of the statute to be 
applied to immigrants who had reentered the United States prior to its 
effective date.  At first glance Fernandez-Vargas might appear to be just 
another example of the Court’s deference to the anti-immigrant policies of 
the legislature that created IIRIRA and the agencies that enforce it. 
However, a closer look at Fernandez-Vargas and the Court’s related 
decisions on IIRIRA’s scope reveals that the Court is using ordinary tools 
of statutory interpretation to determine the outer bounds of that statute’s 
reach, reflecting a broader trend of more normalized treatment of 
immigration law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1982, Humberto Fernandez-Vargas illegally entered the United States 
from Mexico.1  This was not his first time crossing the border; he had been 
deported in 1970 and again in 1981, but he had no criminal record aside 
from his immigration violations.2  After reentering the country a second 
time in 1982, Fernandez-Vargas stayed in the United States for over twenty 
years.  He started a trucking business, had a son in 1989, and then married 
the mother of his child, herself a U.S. citizen, in 2001.3  His wife filed a 
relative visa petition on his behalf and then an application to adjust his legal 
status.4  The couple paid a fine of $1000 for Fernandez-Vargas’s illegal 
entry, and hoped that their application would be granted so that he could 
become a lawful permanent resident.5 
Unfortunately for Fernandez-Vargas, his adjustment application only 
notified the government of his illegal reentry into the country two decades 
earlier.6  In the twenty years that Fernandez-Vargas had been living in the 
United States, immigration law had changed drastically.  In 1996, Congress, 
reacting to a wave of anti-immigrant sentiment, passed the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA),7 a bill 
containing numerous provisions restricting or eliminating numerous forms 
of immigration relief.  Among IIRIRA’s provisions was a change in the 
immigration consequences of illegal reentry.  Under IIRIRA, Fernandez-
 
 1. Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30, 35 (2006). 
 2. Petitioner’s Opening Brief at 7, Fernandez-Vargas, 548 U.S. 30  (No. 03-9610), 
2004 WL 5293897, at *5 [hereinafter Fernandez-Vargas Brief]. 
 3. Fernandez-Vargas, 548 U.S. at 35. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Fernandez-Vargas Brief, supra note 2, at *3. 
 6. Fernandez-Vargas, 548 U.S. at 35. 
 7. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009–546 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 8, 
18 U.S.C.). 
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Vargas’s deportation order from 1981 would be automatically reinstated 
without review, meaning that he was ineligible for the marriage-based 
immigration benefit he had applied for.8  When Fernandez-Vargas showed 
up for the interview in connection with his adjustment of status application, 
he was arrested and taken into custody by the Bureau of Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement.9 
Fernandez-Vargas petitioned the Tenth Circuit to review his 
reinstatement order, challenging it on the grounds that he should not be 
bound by a change in law that occurred after he had made the choice to 
reenter the country.10 
Fernandez-Vargas was not alone in his challenge.  Many other aliens 
found themselves in his exact situation:  having been deported at some prior 
date, they had reentered the country, stayed, and built lives in the United 
States only to have their status discovered many years later after the laws 
had changed, automatically reinstating their former deportation orders and 
denying them the chance for a review that might take account of the lives 
that they had built since then. 
Challenges to IIRIRA’s application worked their way up through ten of 
the U.S. circuit courts.11  The appellate decisions emerged divided:  eight 
circuits held that IIRIRA’s changes could apply to the immigrants who 
entered before the law went into effect, but two circuits disagreed.12  And 
so in 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court took up Fernandez-Vargas’s case to 
settle the issue.13  In the end, the Court decided that the changes brought 
about by IIRIRA would apply to Fernandez-Vargas (and other similarly 
situated immigrants).14 
Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales15 remains among the Court’s most 
important decisions addressing the retroactivity of IIRIRA.  In Fernandez-
Vargas, the Court interpreted IIRIRA to operate retroactively in applying 
the sections of the law that provide for automatic reinstatement of removal 
orders of aliens who had been previously deported and then reentered the 
United States prior to the law’s effective date.16 
However, in the wake of that ruling, the circuit courts have held that the 
same provision of IIRIRA may not be retroactively applied to aliens who 
reentered the United States but applied for an adjustment of status prior to 
the law going into effect.17  This results in a somewhat striking outcome:  
two otherwise identically situated groups of immigrants who entered the 
country before IIRIRA went into effect are given differing outcomes based 
solely on whether and when they applied for an adjustment of status. 
 
 8. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) (2012). 
 9. Fernandez-Vargas v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 881, 883 (2005). 
 10. Id. at 844. 
 11. Fernandez-Vargas, 548 U.S. at 36 n.5. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 33. 
 14. Id. 
 15. 548 U.S. 30 (2006). 
 16. Id. at 38. 
 17. See infra Part IV.D–E. 
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Why should the retroactivity of a law like IIRIRA turn on so thin a reed 
as to when the alien applies for a benefit?  Should the constitutionality of a 
statute rise or fall on such random circumstances?  Put differently, is there a 
way of explaining the difference in outcomes seen in the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Fernandez-Vargas and the lower courts’ rulings?  The answer 
may lie in a subtler set of questions about the scope of judicial review in 
immigration—a matter that appears to be developing slowly and 
incrementally. 
This Note examines the tradition of deferential review in immigration 
law, as well as the Court’s more recent analysis of cases centered on 
IIRIRA’s provisions limiting judicial review, in an attempt to place 
Fernandez-Vargas and the related circuit decisions on IIRIRA’s 
retroactivity in greater context.  It concludes that despite their divergent 
results, the cases examining IIRIRA’s retroactivity are illustrative of a 
greater trend away from the historical treatment of immigration law as an 
area reserved for the political branches and toward a more rigorous review 
of immigration laws using ordinary tools of statutory interpretation. 
This Note proceeds in five parts.  Part I outlines the history of IIRIRA 
and details some of the changes it implemented, specifically those dealt 
with in the Fernandez-Vargas line of cases.  Next, Part II describes the 
tradition of deferential review in immigration law and looks at some areas 
in which immigration-related legislation and administrative rules continue 
to receive more deferential review than expected.  Part III reviews the 
Court’s reactions to IIRIRA and finds that the Court has repeatedly 
reviewed IIRIRA in an ordinary, nondeferential manner.  Part IV turns to 
the analysis of IIRIRA’s retroactivity, examining Fernandez-Vargas and 
the related circuit cases that deal with IIRIRA’s temporal scope.  Finally, 
Part V concludes that despite their differing outcomes, the line of cases 
examining IIRIRA’s retroactivity are consistent with a broader trend in 
which immigration law has shifted from being an exceptional area of law 
subject to only passing review, to one that courts now subject to more 
normalized appraisal, using the ordinary tools of statutory interpretation. 
I.   IIRIRA:  A HARSHER IMMIGRATION REGIME 
Understanding Fernandez-Vargas and its progeny requires some 
background on IIRIRA itself.  Part I begins by providing a brief review of 
the events that led to the passage of IIRIRA.  It then examines some of the 
changes that the law implemented, specifically those that were the subject 
of Fernandez-Vargas and the related lower court cases. 
In 1952, Congress passed the Immigration and Nationality Act18 (INA), 
which covered immigration quotas; entry, exclusion, and deportation 
proceedings; visa issuance and inspection; and the legal relief available to 
those facing deportation.19  Although it has been continually amended for 
 
 18. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of  8, 18, 22 U.S.C.). 
 19. RICHARD D. STEEL, STEEL ON IMMIGRATION LAW § 1:2 (2014). 
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the past sixty years, the statute continues to serve as the basic framework 
for current U.S. immigration law.20 
The most significant and expansive changes to the INA occurred in the 
mid-1990s.21  In 1994, the Republican Party gained majorities in both the 
House and Senate, and within two years Congress passed an omnibus bill 
that drastically altered the existing legal landscape in immigration law.22  
IIRIRA was signed into law in 1996.23 
The law was prompted by a number of different concerns that are 
reflected in the changes that it made to the INA.  An increase in anti-
immigrant sentiment in the early 1990s following the 1993 World Trade 
Center bombing and the 1996 Oklahoma City bombing precipitated calls 
for systemic immigration reform (despite the fact that the perpetrators of the 
Oklahoma City bombing turned out to be U.S. citizens).24  IIRIRA was also 
motivated in part by frustration over perceived frivolous litigation filed by 
immigrants who sought to use applications for judicial review as a tactic to 
stall for time in otherwise groundless cases.25  Additionally, the legislative 
history of the statute indicates that at least some members of Congress 
believed that judges were improperly overturning agency decisions on 
technicalities simply because they found an immigrant’s story to be 
compelling.26 
Animated by these concerns, Congress amended the INA in two 
significant ways:  it (1) substantially cut back on the availability of judicial 
review of immigration agency rulings and (2) eliminated many forms of 
 
 20. Id. 
 21. See Brent Asseff, Reinstatement of Removal and IIRIRA Retroactivity After 
Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales:  Restoring Section 212(c) Discretion and Fairness to 
Immigration Law, 46 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 157, 158 (2007). 
 22. See Zoe Lofgren, A Decade of Radical Change in Immigration Law:  An Inside 
Perspective, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 349, 349 (2005). 
 23. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 8, 
18 U.S.C.).  Congress enacted another law in 1996, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act (AEDPA), which also had substantial consequences for immigration law but 
which falls outside the scope of this Note. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). 
 24. Asseff, supra note 21, at 158; see also Anthony Distinti, Gone but Not Forgotten:  
How Section 212(c) Relief Continues to Divide Courts Presiding over Indictments for Illegal 
Reentry, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2809, 2821 n.98 (2006) (“There has long been a negative 
sentiment toward immigrants based on the belief that they are responsible for social 
problems . . . [such] resentment escalated when it was revealed that illegal aliens were 
responsible for the bombing of the World Trade Center on February 26, 1993, which killed 
six people and injured more than 1000 others.  After the bombing of Oklahoma City on April 
19, 1995, anti-immigration sentiment reached a new peak though it was later revealed that 
two U.S. citizens were responsible for the attack.” (quoting Yen H. Trinh, The Impact of 
New Policies Adopted After September 11 on Lawful Permanent Residents Facing 
Deportation Under the AEDPA and IIRIRA and the Hope of Relief Under the Family 
Reunification Act, 33 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 543, 545 (2005)). 
 25. David A. Martin, Behind the Scenes on a Different Set:  What Congress Needs to Do 
in the Aftermath of St. Cyr and Nguyen, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 313, 320–24 (2002). 
 26. Id. at 329 (“[S]ome staff and members of Congress considered that overly 
sympathetic judges were misusing review in this realm to flyspeck opinions by the Board or 
the immigration judge, identify minute errors, remand the case, and thereby block the 
removal of aliens that the administrative authorities had found to be poor candidates for a 
favorable exercise of discretion, but for whom the judge harbored sympathy.”). 
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relief that had been available to aliens facing exclusion and deportation 
orders.27 
Prior to IIRIRA, federal courts had exercised the majority of their power 
in immigration law through the review of decisions by the administrative 
immigration agencies such as the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).28  
Section 106 of the INA provided for judicial review of final orders of 
deportation or exclusion issued by the BIA,29 and an alien’s case was 
automatically stayed pending the completion of that review.30  Additionally, 
district courts were able to review a broad range of other non-deportation-
related matters, including petitions for visas, protected status, and labor 
certifications.31  Courts were also able to review a limited set of 
immigration orders through habeas review.32 
However, IIRIRA sharply limited judicial review of discretionary 
determinations made by the BIA, precluding courts from reviewing 
decisions on “applications for adjustment of status, voluntary departure, 
nonimmigrant visa petitions, and waivers of inadmissibility.”33 
This meant that among other things, IIRIRA had the effect of tightening 
restrictions on aliens because immigration agencies now often had the final 
word on their cases.  Most relevant to the discussion below, IIRIRA also 
enlarged the class of aliens whose old deportation orders could be 
automatically reinstated if they were found to have illegally reentered the 
country, and it limited the possible relief available to immigrants to combat 
their resurrected removal orders.34 
 
 27. Id. at 314 (“Congress sought to cut back on judicial review in three different and 
sometimes overlapping ways:  (1) by person, (2) by issue, and (3) by timing—that is, 
consolidating issues for unified and streamlined review.”). 
 28. Until 2002, the INS was the primary agency in charge of administering and 
enforcing immigration law.  After it was abolished, its functions were transferred to a variety 
of different agencies, the majority of which are housed under the Department of Homeland 
Security. STEEL, supra note 19, § 1:3.  Immigration law is now administered by numerous 
different agencies that often have concurrent and overlapping powers. See id. §§ 2:1–:21. 
 29. NAT’L IMMIGRATION PROJECT OF THE NAT’L LAWYERS GUILD, IMMIGRATION LAW 
AND DEFENSE § 10:22, at 1 (2013). 
 30. See Arevalo v. Ashcroft, 344 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2003). 
 31. NAT’L IMMIGRATION PROJECT OF THE NAT’L LAWYERS GUILD, supra note 29, § 10:21 
(“The district court can review final agency orders such as the denial of visa petitions, INS’ 
failure to process an adjustment of status application based on selection in the Diversity Visa 
lottery, registry, waivers, change of nonimmigrant status, denial of extension of temporary 
stay, denial of an application for temporary protected status, denial of a stay of deportation, 
denial of labor certifications, DHS’ invalidation of an approved labor certification due to 
alleged fraud, denial of deferred action status, denial of petition for remission or mitigation 
of vehicle forfeiture, denial of adjustment of status by the district director, revocation of an 
approved immigrant visa petition, determinations that an employment-based immigrant visa 
petition is not portable under INA § 204(j) [8 U.S.C.A. § 1154(j)], determinations that a 
labor certification was not ‘approvable when filed’ within the meaning of INA § 245(i) [8 
U.S.C.A. § 1255(i)], denial of I-730 derivative asylum petitions, revocation of advance 
parole, and denial of release on parole.” (alteration in original)). 
 32. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2012); see also INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001). 
 33. NAT’L IMMIGRATION PROJECT OF THE NAT’L LAWYERS GUILD, supra note 29, § 10:21. 
 34. Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30, 33 (2006). 
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Under the old law (section 212(c) of the INA), the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) could only reinstate the previous deportation 
or exclusion orders of illegal reentrants who had been deported on specific 
grounds,35 and those reentrants were permitted to seek review and 
discretionary relief with the Attorney General.36  After IIRIRA, the 
government could reinstate the order of any illegal reentrant and the 
opportunity to seek review was eliminated.  Section 241(a)(5) of the INA 
now reads: 
If the Attorney General finds that an alien has reentered the United States 
illegally after having been removed or having departed voluntarily, under 
an order of removal, the prior order of removal is reinstated from its 
original date and is not subject to being reopened or reviewed, the alien is 
not eligible and may not apply for any relief under this chapter, and the 
alien shall be removed under the prior order at any time after the 
reentry.37 
It came as no surprise that aliens who illegally reentered the United 
States after IIRIRA had a much harder time staying in the country.  
However, IIRIRA’s changes also had the effect of fundamentally altering 
the judiciary’s role in immigration law.  The automatic reinstatement of 
prior administrative decisions, and the myriad of provisions which 
restricted judicial review of agency decisions, drastically limited courts’ 
role in immigration law.  As far as Congress was concerned, the courts no 
longer needed to concern themselves with reviewing BIA actions like 
reinstated removal orders; such forceful and life-altering rulings now would 
be automatic and final.38  A year after the law was passed, one commentator 
 
 35. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e) (1994) (repealed 1996) (noting that aliens who had been 
deported for person smuggling, on national security grounds or certain criminal violations, 
for failing to register, or the falsification of documents were eligible for reinstatement). 
 36. Asseff, supra note 21, at 160–61 n.23.  In pertinent part, section 212(c) provided: 
Should the Attorney General find that any alien has unlawfully reentered the 
United States after having previously departed or been deported pursuant to an 
order of deportation, whether before or after June 27, 1952, on any ground 
described in any of the paragraphs enumerated in subsection (e) of this section, the 
previous order of deportation shall be deemed to be reinstated from its original 
date and such alien shall be deported under such previous order at any time 
subsequent to reentry.” 
8 U.S.C. § 1252(f) (1994) (repealed 1996); see also Alvarez-Portillo v. Ashcroft, 280 F.3d 
858, 862 (8th Cir. 2002) (noting that before IIRIRA, reinstatement of removal was a “little-
used” provision, which “did not apply to aliens . . . who were deported for entering the 
country without inspection”). 
 37. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) (2012).  For simplicity, the remainder of this Note will often 
refer to section 241(a)(5) or section 1231(a)(5) of IIRIRA, though in fact IIRIRA merely 
amended these sections of the INA. 
 38. For a pointed critique of the consequences of IIRIRA, see Brooke Hardin, 
Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales:  An Examination of Retroactivity and the Effect of the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, 27 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. 
JUDICIARY 291, 297–98 (2007) (“IIRIRA rests the power of an alien’s continued tenure in 
the United States in the hand of just one immigration official.  This lone official may and 
‘shall order the alien removed from the United States without further hearing or review.’  
Not only is the decision given to only one immigration official, these expedited deportation 
orders are neither administratively nor judicially reviewable.  Thus, an alien forcing 
deportation has no recourse, no matter how grave the consequences may be . . . .  Obviously, 
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wrote:  “If judicial review of administrative orders depriving noncitizens of 
the opportunity to live in the United States is an essential part of the rule of 
law, then 1996 may well become known as the year in which the rule of 
immigration law died.”39 
This illegal reentry provision was one of the many changes wrought by 
IIRIRA affecting how immigrants’ cases would be processed and 
adjudicated by the mixture of immigration agencies and the federal courts.  
While these changes appeared unabashedly severe, their ultimate impact 
turned out to depend in many ways on how the federal courts—including 
the Supreme Court—would chose to interpret their scope.  Ordinarily, 
judicial deference likely might be assumed.  After all, the Supreme Court 
has a long history of judicial restraint where “exceptional” areas such as 
immigration and national security are concerned.40  The Court very well 
could have been expected to defer to Congress and the immigration 
agencies, which sought expansive readings of IIRIRA.  But this did not 
always happen.  At times, the courts have interpreted IIRIRA  narrowly, 
preserving judicial review for some small, yet important, classes of 
immigrants.  Before turning to the Court’s interpretive stance toward 
IIRIRA and its scope, it is thus useful to examine how the Court has 
traditionally reviewed immigration laws.  To that end, Part II examines the 
Court’s traditional deference to the political branches on immigration 
issues. 
II.   JUDICIAL REVIEW OF IMMIGRATION LAW:  A HISTORY OF DEFERENCE 
Traditionally, immigration law has been treated by the Court as an 
exceptional area of law subject to only the most limited review, and 
commentators have long derided the Court’s passive role in the field.41  
Citing the doctrine of plenary power, the low level of equal protection 
review afforded to statutes that target aliens, and the tendency of the Court 
to defer to immigration agencies without first conducting a comprehensive 
analysis of statutes, critics have argued that the Court’s passivity has led to 
less protection for immigrants than would otherwise be expected, due to the 
weakening of doctrines that are leveraged more strongly in other areas of 
the law.42 
 
though, under IIRIRA, Congress decided that only very limited due process is required to 
fulfill this Constitutional requirement for deportable aliens.” (quoting Immigration and 
Nationality Act § 241(a)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5)). 
 39. Daniel Kanstroom, Surrounding the Hole in the Doughnut:  Discretion and 
Deference in U.S. Immigration Law, 71 TUL. L. REV. 703, 704 (1997). 
 40. See, e.g., Hiroshi Motomura, Federalism, International Human Rights, and 
Immigration Exceptionalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1361, 1392–94 (1999); Rachel E. 
Rosenbloom, The Citizenship Line:  Rethinking Immigration Exceptionalism, 54 B.C. L. 
REV. 1965, 1981–89 (2013). 
 41. See generally Kanstroom, supra note 39; Shruti Rana, Chevron Without the Courts?:  
The Supreme Court’s Recent Chevron Jurisprudence Through an Immigration Lens, 26 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 313 (2012). 
 42. See infra Part II.A–C. 
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A.   Plenary Power 
A plain reading of the Constitution finds the congressional power to 
regulate immigration rooted in Article I, Section 8’s authority to “establish 
a uniform Rule of Naturalization.”43  However, such authority was 
expanded dramatically in 1889 when the Court decided Chae Chan Ping v. 
United States,44 holding for the first time  that Congress has what is now 
known as “plenary power” to regulate immigration (though that phrase 
never appears in the case).45 
In Chae Chan Ping, the Court held that in addition to its constitutional 
foundation, congressional power to regulate immigration stems from the 
more fundamental ideas of state sovereignty and a nation’s need to protect 
itself.46  More importantly, the Court also suggested that when Congress 
exercises its power over immigration, its decisions should not be subject to 
judicial review.47 
Of course, the Court did continue to confront immigration cases, but the 
effect of the plenary power doctrine has meant that, historically, courts have 
generally given Congress almost complete deference when reviewing 
federal statutes.48 
Starting in the 1970s, the Court began to conduct limited judicial review 
in some immigration cases; however, courts continued to give Congress 
broad deference under the plenary power doctrine.49  In modern cases, 
while the influence of the plenary power doctrine appears to have lessened, 
the Court has continually declined to explicitly outline its scope when 
reviewing statutes.50  Nevertheless, the Court has been unable to escape the 
 
 43. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 44. 130 U.S. 581 (1889). 
 45. Id. at 606 (announcing Congress’s broad authority to bar a foreign national’s entry 
when “the public interests require such exclusion”). 
 46. Id. at 604 (“Any restriction upon [congressional power to exclude aliens], deriving 
validity from an external source, would imply a diminution of its sovereignty to the extent of 
the restriction, and an investment of that sovereignty to the same extent in that power which 
could impose such restriction.” (quoting The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 
Cranch) 116, 136 (1812) (alteration in original)). 
 47. Id. at 606 (“[If Congress] considers the presence of foreigners of a different race in 
this country, who will not assimilate with us, to be dangerous to its peace and security . . . its 
determination is conclusive upon the judiciary.”). 
 48. Stephen H. Legomsky, Fear and Loathing in Congress and the Courts:  Immigration 
and Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1615, 1616–17 (2000) (“[W]hen someone challenges 
the constitutionality of an immigration statute, the courts accord Congress unusually great 
deference, at or approaching nonreviewability.”); see also, e.g., Lloyd Sabaudo Societa 
Anonima Per Azioni v. Elting, 287 U.S. 329, 334 (1932) (“Under the Constitution and laws 
of the United States, control of the admission of aliens is committed exclusively to 
Congress . . . .”); Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909) 
(“[O]ver no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is 
over [the admission of aliens].”). 
 49. Jessica Portmess, Until the Plenary Power Do Us Part:  Judicial Scrutiny of the 
Defense of Marriage Act in Immigration After Flores-Villar, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1825, 1834 
(2012). 
 50. Id. at 1839; see also Gabriel J. Chin, Is There a Plenary Power Doctrine?  A 
Tentative Apology and Prediction for Our Strange but Unexceptional Constitutional 
Immigration Law, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 257 (2000). 
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doctrine altogether and typically still only applies “diluted constitutional 
standards to immigration cases.”51  The powerful precedent of the plenary 
power doctrine ensures that Congress continues to enjoy substantial 
deference in the area of immigration in a manner that is not seen in other 
areas of constitutional law.52 
B.   Equal Protection 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is one of the 
most important sources of judicial protection of individual rights that might 
otherwise be infringed on by the political branches.53  It is also an area 
where the Court has explicitly set up a system of different levels of 
deference to be used depending on the group that is being affected by 
legislation.54 
The Equal Protection Clause provides that no state shall “deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”55  The same 
restriction is applied to federal laws through the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment,56 but, perhaps because the courts have held that the 
Constitution gives Congress plenary power over immigration, federal 
immigration legislation is usually only subject to a very deferential level of 
judicial review even when considered under the equal protection 
framework.57 
When reviewing statutes under the equal protection framework, the Court 
applies three levels of scrutiny that affect how much deference is given to 
the professed objectives behind the laws.  The least deferential is called 
strict scrutiny and is applied in situations in which the legislation at issue 
discriminates based on a suspect classification or denies an individual a 
fundamental right.58  Only laws that are narrowly tailored to advance a 
compelling state interest may pass strict scrutiny.59 
More deferential than strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny applies when 
legislation discriminates against classes that have been identified as quasi-
suspect and requires that the law is “substantially related to an important 
governmental objective.”60 
The most deferential level of scrutiny is rational basis, which applies to 
any law that is not subject to the other heightened levels of scrutiny.61  To 
 
 51. Portmess, supra note 49, at 1839. 
 52. Legomsky, supra note 48, at 1631–32. 
 53. Jason H. Lee, Unlawful Status As a “Constitutional Irrelevancy”?:  The Equal 
Protection Rights of Illegal Immigrants, 39 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 1, 28 (2008). 
 54. Karen Nelson Moore, Madison Lecture:  Aliens and the Constitution, 88 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 801, 822–23 (2013). 
 55. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 56. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). 
 57. See Justin Hess, Nonimmigrants, Equal Protection, and the Supremacy Clause, 2010 
B.Y.U. L. REV. 2277, 2289–90. 
 58. 16B C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 1116 (2013). 
 59. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). 
 60. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988). 
 61. 16B C.J.S., supra note 58, Constitutional Law § 1120. 
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pass muster under rational basis, a law need only be rationally related to a 
legitimate state interest.62 
While the frameworks for equal protection review might seem 
straightforward, their application in the immigration context has been 
anything but.  In the words of one commentator, “At the intersection of 
immigration and equal protection lies a judicial vortex.  This area of law is 
a twilight zone of sorts, where established constitutional principles do not 
follow their regular paths.”63 
Notably, the equal protection framework generally intersects not with 
immigration law itself (the rules governing the entry, expulsion, and 
detention of noncitizens) but rather with the related but distinguishable area 
of constitutional alienage law (alienage-based classifications affecting the 
rights and obligations of noncitizens).  The plenary power doctrine holds far 
less sway over constitutional alienage law.64  Nevertheless, the application 
of the equal protection framework to alienage law is somewhat muddled 
and often finds immigrants receiving more deferential levels of review in 
spite of the vulnerabilities that accompany their status.65 
Early on, the Court held outside the immigration context that the 
Fourteenth Amendment protects noncitizens as well as citizens from the 
reach of state laws.66  However, while the Court has found that laws that 
classify based on alienage are subject to strict scrutiny under the Equal 
Protection Clause,67 the Court has yet to define alienage with sufficient 
clarity and has generally only applied strict scrutiny where alienage laws 
are challenged by immigrants who are permanent residents.68 
The Court has also carved out exceptions to the application of strict 
scrutiny to alienage laws that discriminate against aliens who are permanent 
residents.  For example, permanent residents may be excluded from holding 
 
 62. See Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 60 (1982). 
 63. Hess, supra note 57, at 2277. 
 64. See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power:  
Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 565 (1990). 
 65. See id. at 574 n.155 (“Of the examples . . . of groups—‘discrete and insular 
minorities’—favored by statutory interpretation, only aliens in immigration law cases stand 
out as unprotected by analogous judicial concern at the constitutional level.”). 
 66. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886). 
 67. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).  
Alienage is among those factors which are 
so seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state interest that laws 
grounded in such considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy—a 
view that those in the burdened class are not as worthy or deserving as others.  For 
these reasons and because such discrimination is unlikely to be soon rectified by 
legislative means, these laws are subjected to strict scrutiny and will be sustained 
only if they are suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest. 
Id. 
 68. See Hess, supra note 57, at 2278; see also LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 415 (5th 
Cir. 2005) (“Thus far, the Supreme Court has reviewed with strict scrutiny only state laws 
affecting permanent resident aliens.”). 
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positions that carry a political function so long as the restrictions meet the 
deferential rational basis level of scrutiny.69 
The Court has been similarly inconsistent when it comes to determining 
what level of scrutiny applies to laws that discriminate against illegal 
immigrants.  In Plyler v. Doe,70 the Court held that illegal aliens are not a 
suspect class entitled to heightened scrutiny, and yet the Court seemed to 
apply intermediate scrutiny, striking down a Texas law that denied illegal-
immigrant children access to public schools because the law did not further 
a “substantial goal of the State.”71  Both the dissent in Plyler and the Fifth 
Circuit noted that while the Court professed to be applying rational basis, 
they were in fact subjecting the law to closer scrutiny.72 
Despite Plyler’s somewhat confusing outcome, in general the opinion 
provides language that indicates that states need only justify classifications 
of illegal aliens by showing that there is some rational relationship between 
the classification and the interest sought to be protected by the law.73 
In whole, the equal protection analysis itself provides a more in-depth 
review of alienage legislation than the plenary power doctrine has for 
ordinary immigration law.74  Nevertheless, a review of the cases shows that, 
in general, statutes that discriminate based on alienage receive a more 
deferential level of review than those that discriminate against other groups 
with similar legal vulnerabilities. 
The Court reviews state laws that discriminate against illegal aliens under 
the relatively cursory rational basis review, and in some cases even uses 
rational basis review for laws that discriminate against immigrants who 
have become lawful permanent residents.75  These cases indicate that when 
it comes to aliens and equal protection, the Court will generally defer to 
both state and federal legislatures. 
The reason for such limited review may be due to the fact that an 
immigrant’s alienage status often belies the complexities of his or her 
particular legal situation76 or it may be because alienage law still finds itself 
 
 69. See Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 296 (1978) (“[B]ecause this country entrusts 
many of its most important policy responsibilities to these officers . . .  it represents the 
choice, and right, of the people to be governed by their citizen peers.”); see also Gregory v. 
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 476–77 (1991); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973). 
 70. 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982) (“Undocumented aliens cannot be treated as a suspect 
class because their presence in this country in violation of federal law is not a ‘constitutional 
irrelevancy.’”). 
 71. Id. at 224. 
 72. Hess, supra note 57, at 2284. 
 73. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 219 n.19, 223. 
 74. Motomura, supra note 64, at 566 (“[The alienage equal protection cases] took . . . 
constitutional claims seriously, in contrast to the cavalier treatment of constitutional claims 
in immigration law.”). 
 75. Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 295–96 (1978). 
 76. Hess, supra note 57, at 2287–88 (“[Individuals] enter the United States for different 
reasons, under different conditions, and under different obligations.  The Supreme Court has 
refused to use heightened equal protection scrutiny, (anything more than a rational basis), for 
heterogeneous classes that are ‘large, diverse, and amorphous.’” (quoting San Antonio 
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)). 
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in the shadow of immigration law and the plenary power law that 
accompanies it.77 
C.   Administrative Adjudication 
Commentators have also critiqued how the Court reviews administrative 
decisions in the immigration context.  Chief among the concerns raised is 
the worry that the Court is not applying the famous Chevron78 doctrine with 
the proper rigor (or alternatively, that the Court is reformulating the 
doctrine) when reviewing decisions from administrative immigration 
agencies. 
In Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,79  the 
Court created a two-step framework for evaluating when to give force to an 
agency’s interpretation of a statute.  The first step requires federal courts to 
determine whether a statute is ambiguous.80  Where a statute is ambiguous, 
the court will defer to the agency’s construction of the statute so long as it is 
reasonable, an inquiry that constitutes the second step of the test.81  “In this 
manner, Chevron gave both the federal courts and agencies a role in 
interpreting statutes.”82 
Professor Shruti Rana argues that recent immigration jurisprudence 
reveals that the Court has increasingly declined to perform its traditional 
interpretive role, preferring to allow agencies to interpret statutes and then 
merely assessing the agencies’ results.83  Driving this shift is agencies’ 
increasing invocation of the Court’s ruling in National Cable & 
Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services84 as a way to 
“bypass judicial constructions contrary to the agency’s views” and “avoid 
statutory interpretations the agency believes [are] unfavorable.”85 
In Brand X, the Court held that where a statute is ambiguous, not only 
must courts defer to reasonable agency interpretations, but agencies may 
themselves actively disregard judicial constructions of statutes.86  
Furthermore, Brand X requires that courts must yield to agencies’ 
interpretations in preference to the courts’ own precedents if the statute is 
ambiguous and the agency’s interpretation is reasonable.87  Taken broadly, 
Brand X makes agencies, and not courts, the final arbiters of the law.88 
 
 77. Id. at 2279 (arguing that “[b]ecause Congress has plenary power over immigration, 
courts should approach discriminatory state laws by first evaluating their constitutionality 
under the Supremacy Clause”); see also Motomura, supra note 64, at 574 (“[T]he plenary 
power doctrine smothers the entire field of immigration law . . . completely.”). 
 78. Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 79. See id. at 842. 
 80. See id. at 843–44. 
 81. See id. 
 82. Rana, supra note 41, at 315 n.2. 
 83. Id. at 322. 
 84. 545 U.S. 967 (2005). 
 85. Rana, supra note 41, at 347–48 (citation omitted). 
 86. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 1017. 
 87. Id. at 980–81. 
 88. Rana, supra note 41, at 317 (“[In Brand X,] the Court came close to declaring that 
‘[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the [agency] to say what the law is.’” 
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Professor Rana examined a number of recent Supreme Court immigration 
cases and concludes that the use of Brand X has reduced the courts’ role to 
that of “error-checking” the reasonableness of agency action rather than 
actively interpreting statutes, resulting in the collapse of Chevron’s two-
step test into a single step.89 
She argues that this deference is problematic not only because the Court 
seems to be ceding an important role traditionally held by the judiciary, but 
also because it comes at a point when the immigration agencies are 
overburdened and thus most vulnerable to abusing and misusing the power 
that is being deferred to them.90 
Taken together, the plenary power afforded to congressional legislation 
on immigration, the relatively low level of scrutiny used to review statutes 
that discriminate against aliens, and the erosion of full Chevron review in 
administrative immigration cases seem to solidify the notion that courts 
generally have been deferential to the political branches when it comes to 
immigration. 
Given such a pattern, one might expect that the Court would only subject 
IIRIRA to the most passing and deferential judicial review, resulting in an 
expansive application of the law.  However, a review of the cases in which 
the Court has addressed the scope of IIRIRA, in particular its decisions on 
the availability of judicial review under the statute, reveal that the Court has 
continually used the tools at its disposal to limit IIRIRA’s application.91  
Somewhat surprisingly, the IIRIRA cases indicate that the Court is still 
willing to conduct in-depth analysis of immigration laws in some areas. 
III.   THE COURT’S SURPRISING REACTIONS TO IIRIRA 
In the last two decades, the Court has had numerous opportunities to 
interpret the scope of a number of IIRIRA’s provisions.  Among other 
things, the Court has:   reviewed the validity of the law’s restrictions on 
judicial review of removal determinations,92 determined whether an offense 
was an “aggravated felony” for the purposes of the provision,93 adjudicated 
 
(modifying the famous quote from Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) 
(alteration in original))). 
 89. Id. at 353. 
 90. Id. at 318–19.  Professor Rana notes that the BIA is “buckl[ing] under a mammoth 
caseload, replacing three-judge panels with single judges, commonly issuing one-line 
summary affirmances of immigration judges’ decisions (decisions which are themselves 
coming from a geographically and politically dispersed group of immigration judges) 
without either endorsing those judges’ rationales or suggesting alternatives, and issuing 
opinions that federal appellate judges across the political and jurisprudential spectrum have 
found indefensible,” and similarly, that the Executive Office for Immigration Review is 
“beset with so many severe problems—from overburdened courts and an enormous backlog 
of cases, to charges of bias, to endemic mistakes, to widely inconsistent decision making—
‘[t]hat the American asylum system has fallen into disrepute is no longer a significantly 
contested point of debate.’” Id. (citing Eliot Walker, Asylees in Wonderland:  A New 
Procedural Perspective on America’s Asylum System, 2 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 1, 2 (2007)). 
 91. See infra Part III. 
 92. See Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 476 (1999). 
 93. Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 3 (2004). 
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when the government can exercise discretion as to removal destination,94 
determined how an alien may calculate residence to meet the temporal 
requirements for eligibility for cancellation of removal,95 examined the 
limits of IIRIRA’s provision for post-removal-period detention,96 reviewed 
whether an alien may withdraw from a voluntary departure agreement under 
the provision,97 determined whether the law barred judicial review of a 
denial of an alien’s motion to reopen removal proceedings,98 examined 
what standard governs stays of removal pending judicial review under the 
statute,99 and ruled on whether IIRIRA bars habeas corpus review of 
discretionary relief from deportation.100 
IIRIRA contains a number of provisions that explicitly strip federal 
courts of jurisdiction to review immigration decisions.101  Inevitably, the 
Court faced several opportunities to review these provisions, and while the 
Court did cede some jurisdiction where explicitly required to do so,102  it 
took a very nondeferential stand when it refused to read the statute’s 
provisions as stripping it of its jurisdiction over habeas review.103  In the 
cases below, the Court found that broader readings of IIRIRA would lead to 
conflicts with the fundamental powers and protections in the Constitution. 
INS v. St. Cyr104 dealt with two primary issues:  the retroactivity of 
IIRIRA, which is discussed in Part IV, and whether IIRIRA’s provisions 
could deprive courts of the jurisdiction to review an alien’s habeas 
petitions.  Using ordinary tools of interpretation, the Court retained the right 
to review aliens’ habeas petitions.105 
Notwithstanding the ordinary requirement to defer under the notion of 
plenary powers,106 in St. Cyr the Court noted that there is a “strong 
presumption in favor of judicial review of administrative action” and 
therefore that repealing habeas jurisdiction requires a “clear statement of 
 
 94. Jama v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335, 337 (2005). 
 95. See generally Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez, 132 S. Ct. 2011 (2012). 
 96. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 682 (2001). 
 97. See Dada v. Mukasey, 554 U.S. 1, 4 (2008). 
 98. See Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233, 236–37 (2010). 
 99. See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 423–25 (2009). 
 100. See Calcano-Martinez v. INS, 533 U.S. 348, 349 (2001); INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 
289, 292 (2001). 
 101. NAT’L IMMIGRATION PROJECT OF THE NAT’L LAWYERS GUILD, supra note 29; see also 
supra notes 26–38 and accompanying text. 
 102. Calcano-Martinez, 533 U.S. at 351; Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 
525 U.S. 471, 481 (1999) (finding that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction over an 
action in which resident aliens alleged that they had been targeted for deportation because of 
their affiliation with a politically unpopular group, in violation of their constitutional rights). 
 103. Aliens have long been able to petition the courts for writs of habeas corpus in order 
to challenge the legal basis for immigration decisions. See Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 
142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892) (holding that Immigration Act of 1891 did not deprive courts of 
habeas jurisdiction); United States v. Jung Ah Lung, 124 U.S. 621, 628 (1888) (holding that 
Chinese Restriction Acts did not eliminate habeas jurisdiction). 
 104. 533 U.S. 289 (2001). 
 105. Id. at 311. 
 106. See supra notes 42–51 and accompanying text. 
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congressional intent.”107  No such plain statement was found in IIRIRA, 
despite the fact that one of its previsions was titled “Elimination of Custody 
Review by Habeas Corpus.”108 
The Court then used a variety of tools to bolster its ruling.  It invoked the 
canon of construction requiring a clear indication when a statute “invokes 
the outer limits of Congress’s power,” and the substantive canon of 
constitutional avoidance which requires the Court to construe statutes to 
avoid raising constitutional issues where an “alternative interpretation of the 
statute is ‘fairly possible.’”109 
The Court also considered the history of the writ of habeas corpus as a 
“means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention,” as well as a 
means of reviewing “an alien’s eligibility for discretionary relief” in 
immigration cases.110  The Court also noted that habeas corpus proceedings 
are distinct from, and far narrower than, what is termed judicial review or 
jurisdiction to review, under the Administrative Procedure Act.111  As such, 
although the provisions in IIRIRA limited judicial review, the Court 
concluded that they could not be read to preclude habeas review in such 
cases.112 
Not all of the Justices were happy with the choice of interpretive tools 
used in St. Cyr.  In a strong dissent penned by Justice Scalia and joined by 
Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Thomas, and in part by Justice O’Connor, the 
majority opinion is criticized for failing to give force to the plain language 
of the statute and instead “fabricat[ing] . . .[a] ‘magic words’ requirement 
for the congressional expression” of an intent to limit habeas review.113 
In Zadvydas v. Davis,114 the Court used the principles laid out in St. Cyr 
to preclude a reading of IIRIRA that would have allowed for the indefinite 
detention of an alien.115  In particular, the Court invoked the canon of 
constitutional avoidance, eschewing a construction that would raise due 
 
 107. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 299 (“Implications from statutory text or legislative history are 
not sufficient to repeal habeas jurisdiction; instead, Congress must articulate specific and 
unambiguous statutory directives to effect a repeal.” (citing Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (1 
Wall.) 85, 105 (1869))). 
 108. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 § 401(e), 110 
Stat. 1268.  The Court held that “title alone is not controlling,” and found that the exact text 
of the section only repealed an earlier statute that amended the judicial review sections of the 
1952 version of the INA. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 308–09. 
 109. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 299–300 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)).  
The Court found that the habeas provisions in Article I, Section 9, clause 2 of the 
Constitution require judicial intervention in deportation cases, and, as such, reading IIRIRA 
to preclude such intervention would raise a serious constitutional issue. Id. at 300. 
 110. Id. at 301, 304. 
 111. Id. at 312. 
 112. Id. at 312–13; see also Calcano-Martinez v. INS, 533 U.S. 348, 351 (2001) (“We 
agree with petitioners that leaving aliens without a forum for adjudicating claims such as 
those raised in this case would raise serious constitutional questions.  We also agree with 
petitioners—and the Court of Appeals—that these concerns can best be alleviated by 
construing the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of that statute not to preclude aliens such as 
petitioners from pursuing habeas relief pursuant to § 2241.”). 
 113. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 326–27 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 114. 533 U.S. 678 (2001). 
 115. Id. at 689. 
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process concerns, by reading the statute as containing an implicit 
“reasonableness” requirement.116  In doing so, the Court recognized that 
rather than giving the statute its literal construction, it was instead finding 
that the statute “suggests” that the Attorney General has less than unlimited 
discretion.117 
True to St. Cyr, four members of the Court dissented in Zadvydas 
(although a different four), arguing that the majority had chosen to ignore 
the plain meaning of the statute and instead manufactured “constitutional 
impediment[s] to the discretion Congress gave to the Attorney General.”118 
Ultimately, in deciding St. Cyr and Zadvydas, the Court chose to espouse 
principles that favored aliens119 and the Court’s own constitutional 
powers,120 rather than deferring to either the congressional intent embodied 
in an immigration statute that is anti-immigrant and against judicial 
intervention, or to the Attorney General’s office which sought a broader 
interpretation of the INA and IIRIRA.121 
The rationale behind substantive canons, such as the canon of 
constitutional avoidance, is arguably to credit congressional intent by 
assuming that Congress never intended to write a law that plainly violates 
the Constitution, thereby preserving laws by reading them in a way that 
does not require that they be struck down as unconstitutional.122  
Nevertheless, the dissents in St. Cyr and Zadvydas suggest that instead the 
Court is using the canon of constitutional avoidance so as to avoid giving 
full effect to the plain meaning of IIRIRA and the decisions of the agencies 
that enforce it.  That the dissenting Justices are so concerned by what they 
deem to be an overreach of the Court’s power123 suggests that this is one 
area of immigration law in which the Court is unlikely to be accused of 
being overly deferential to the political branches. 
 
 116. Id. at 690–99. 
 117. Id. at 689, 697. 
 118. Id. at 705 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 119. See Jonathan H. Ross, A Gate Forever Closed?  Retiring Immigration Law’s Post-
Departure Bar, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1051, 1068 (2012) (“In recent years, three norms have 
emerged that the Supreme Court has relied on in favor of immigrants:  (1) the presumption 
that administrative actions should be subject to judicial review, even in the immigration 
context; (2) the use of a ‘clear statement rule’ to prevent congressional silence from being 
transformed into a nonexistent legislative mandate; and (3) that immigrants should have 
every opportunity to fight the harsh consequences of removal.”). 
 120. See Lee Kovarsky, A Constitutional Theory of Habeas Power, 99 VA. L. REV. 753, 
754 (2013) (conceptualizing habeas review as “a form of Article III power belonging to 
judges, and not as some sort of right”). 
 121. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 688 (majority opinion). 
 122. See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 382 (2005) (“The canon [of constitutional 
avoidance] is thus a means of giving effect to congressional intent, not of subverting it.”). 
 123. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 705 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“In the guise of judicial 
restraint the Court ought not to intrude upon the other branches.”).  For a similar argument, 
see Justice O’Connor’s partial concurrence in Demore v. Kim. 538 U.S. 510, 553 (2003) 
(O’Conner, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (arguing that the majority 
incorrectly followed St. Cyr’s reasoning to disregard the plain meaning of § 1226(c) of the 
INA in order to preserve habeas review). 
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Even when the Court examined questions about IIRIRA’s scope that did 
not involve clear constitutional conflicts allowing it to invoke the canon of 
constitutional avoidance, the Court still has used other interpretational 
doctrines to read the immigration statute narrowly. 
In Clark v. Martinez,124 the Court revisited its decision in Zadvydas, 
holding that the reasonableness requirement that it had read into the 
provisions applied to inadmissible aliens in the same manner as it did to 
aliens who had been admitted to the United States.125  The Court explained 
its holding as the product of the simple rule that statutory text could not be 
construed to have different meanings depending on the characteristics of the 
aliens it was applied to, despite the fact that the “statutory purpose and 
constitutional concerns influencing the Zadvydas construction are not 
present for inadmissible aliens.”126  As such, the Court eschewed the 
government’s interpretation of the statute in favor of its own even where 
there was no need to do so to avoid a constitutional problem. 
In Dada v. Mukasey,127 the Court again overruled a decision that would 
have given force to the immigration agency’s interpretation of IIRIRA.128  
Dada dealt with two conflicting sections of IIRIRA, “one directing 
voluntary departure and the other directing termination of the motion to 
reopen if an alien departs the United States.”129  A ruling by the BIA, 
affirmed by the Fifth Circuit, held that the result of the two provisions was 
that “an alien who has been granted voluntary departure but fails to depart 
in a timely fashion is statutorily barred from applying for and receiving . . . 
adjustment of status.”130  However, the Court found this result 
unsatisfactory.131  Finding that the language of the two provisions was 
unambiguous, the Court looked instead at the practical effects they created 
and the purpose behind motions to reopen.132  The Court held that 
preserving “the alien’s right to pursue reopening while respecting the 
Government’s interest in the quid pro quo of the voluntary departure 
arrangement” required that aliens be allowed to withdraw their requests for 
voluntary departure before the expiration of the departure period.133 
The dissent in Dada argued that the majority had created a remedy 
without citing the authority of any statute or regulation, in order to solve a 
“‘necessity’ [that] does not exist.”134  Whether or not the case was correctly 
decided, the critiques of the majority’s reasoning and the case’s result in 
overturning the BIA’s interpretation both suggest that the case provides 
 
 124. 543 U.S. 371 (2005). 
 125. Id. at 385. 
 126. Id. at 380. 
 127. 554 U.S. 1 (2008). 
 128. Id. at 6. 
 129. Id. at 5. 
 130. Id. at 7. 
 131. See id. at 18 (“Absent . . . remedial action by this Court, then, the alien who is 
granted voluntary departure but whose circumstances have changed in a manner cognizable 
by a motion to reopen is between Scylla and Charybdis . . . .”). 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 19. 
 134. Id. at 23 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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another example of the Court’s choice not to defer to agencies’ 
interpretations of IIRIRA, even when such interpretations would seem to be 
based on the plain meaning of the statute’s provisions.135 
In Nken v. Holder,136 the Court addressed whether IIIRIRA changed 
appellate courts’ ability to stay an alien’s removal pending his or her 
decision.137  Although the government argued that the courts’ stay power 
should fall under the provisions of IIRIRA that limited injunctive relief, the 
Court held that a stay differed from an injunction and therefore remained 
governed by the less restrictive traditional stay factors.138 
Using textualist arguments, the Court found that if Congress had intended 
the stay power to be governed by the section restricting injunctive relief, it 
would have simply used the word “stay,” as it did in other sections of 
IIRIRA.139  Noting that the power to stay pending judicial review is an 
inherent power of federal appellate courts, the Court again invoked the plain 
statement rule:  “[W]e are loath to conclude that Congress would, ‘without 
clearly expressing such a purpose, deprive the Court of Appeals of its 
customary power to stay orders under review.’”140 
Dissenting in Nken, Justice Alito argued that the majority inappropriately 
used semantics to “nullif[y] an important statutory provision.”141  He 
suggested that the Court did not uphold congressional intent because the 
section restricting injunctive relief was, like other provisions of IIRIRA, 
“aimed at protecting the Executive’s discretion from the courts.  Indeed, 
‘protecting the Executive’s discretion from the courts . . . can fairly be said 
to be the theme of the legislation.’”142  Here again, the dissenting opinion 
from an IIRIRA case suggests that the Court is using statutory tools to craft 
its own interpretations rather than merely deferring to an agency’s 
interpretation or the general scheme and spirit of the law, as characterized 
by the dissent.143 
In Kucana v. Holder,144 the Court again examined the scope of judicial 
review available under IIRIRA.145  The Seventh Circuit had held that 
amendments made to the INA by IIRIRA stripped the courts of the power to 
review not only those administrative decisions made discretionary by 
statute, but also those made discretionary by regulations promulgated and 
adopted by the immigration agencies.146  The Supreme Court disagreed, 
 
 135. Id. 
 136. 556 U.S. 418 (2009). 
 137. Id. at 422. 
 138. Id. at 426. 
 139. Id. at 430–31. 
 140. Id. at 433 (quoting Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 11 (1942)). 
 141. Nken, 556 U.S. at 439 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 142. Id. at 443 (quoting Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 
486 (1999)). 
 143. Id. at 439. 
 144. 558 U.S. 233 (2010). 
 145. Id. at 244. 
 146. Id.  A regulation had been amended a few months before IIRIRA went into force 
which provided that the BIA (exercising authority delegated by the Attorney General) had 
discretion over whether or not to grant or deny a motion to reopen. Id. at 239. 
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determining that the relevant section of IIRIRA applied only to agency 
determinations made discretionary by statute and not by regulation.147  The 
Court based its decision on “the longstanding exercise of judicial review of 
administrative rulings on reopening motions, the text and context of [the 
relevant section of IIRIRA].”148  The Court also invoked a number of 
interpretive doctrines including “the ‘presumption favoring interpretations 
of statutes [to] . . . allow judicial review of administrative action’”149 and 
“[s]eparation-of-powers concerns” which “caution [the Court] against 
reading legislation, absent clear statement, to place in executive hands 
authority to remove cases from the Judiciary’s domain.”150  Accordingly, 
the decision in Kucana provides another example of the Court’s choice to 
actively use a wide array of tools of statutory interpretation rather than 
simply defer to the interpretation of an executive agency. 
IV.   THE RETROACTIVITY DECISIONS 
Determining the retroactive reach of IIRIRA’s provisions presented the 
Court with the opportunity to either expand the law’s application or to 
temper and contract its anti-immigrant outcomes. Like the decisions above, 
the cases on IIRIRA’s retroactivity all tended towards a more ordinary form 
of statutory interpretation, rather than blind deference to the political 
branches. However, before explaining the decisions themselves, it is 
necessary to provide some background information on retroactivity.  
Therefore, Part IV begins with a brief background of the judicial 
apprehensions towards retroactive legislation, and the test the Court created 
to examine a statute’s retroactive effects.  Part IV then examines a series of 
cases in which the Supreme Court and the circuit courts applied the test for 
retroactivity to IIRIRA’s provisions. 
A.   The Dangers of Retroactivity 
American jurisprudence has long disfavored the retroactive application of 
new laws.151  This principle has roots in the Ex Post Facto Clause of the 
Constitution152 and is motivated by concerns over fair notice,153 the need to 
 
 147. Id. at 237. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. (quoting Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 63–64 (1993)). 
 150. Id. 
 151. 2 NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 41:2, at 376 (7th 
ed. 2001); see also Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 265 (1994) (“[T]he 
presumption against retroactive legislation is deeply rooted in our jurisprudence, and 
embodies a legal doctrine centuries older than our Republic.”). 
 152. Alvarez-Portillo v. Ashcroft, 280 F.3d 858, 867 (8th Cir. 2002). 
 153. See 2 SINGER, supra note 151, § 41:2 (“There is general consensus that notice or 
warning of a rule should be given in advance of the actions whose effects will be judged.  
The hackneyed maxim that everyone is held to know the law, itself a principle of dubious 
wisdom, nevertheless presupposes that the law is at least susceptible of being known.  But 
this is not possible for law that has yet to exist.”). 
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provide stability and predictability,154 and a desire to protect “legitimate 
expectations and settled transactions.”155  Additionally, retroactive statutes 
raise the specter of the use of legislation as a tool for political oppression.156  
Nevertheless, Congress may enact retrospective legislation within 
constitutional limits.157  To ensure that ex post facto legislation is properly 
limited, statutes are only given retroactive effect when it is unequivocally 
clear that Congress intended them to have such effect.158  While requiring a 
clear mandate of retroactivity creates a strict standard for legislators,159 it 
ensures that retrospective legislation is only created deliberately, hopefully 
after consideration of the potentially unfair consequences of such 
legislation.160  These considerations are captured in the leading Supreme 
Court treatment of the retroactivity of statutes, Landgraf v. USI Film 
Products.161 
B.   The Landgraf Test 
In 1994, the Supreme Court established a two-pronged test for the 
analysis of retrospective legislation in Landgraf.162  The first prong of the 
test incorporates the general rule that statutes must contain legislative 
authorization of retroactivity to be given retrospective effect:  “[T]he 
court’s first task is to determine whether Congress has expressly prescribed 
the statute’s proper reach.  If Congress has done so, of course, there is no 
need to resort to judicial default rules.”163  Accordingly, the first prong 
recognizes that Congress may have legitimate reasons for enacting 
 
 154. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 265–66 (“In a free, dynamic society, creativity in both 
commercial and artistic endeavors is fostered by a rule of law that gives people confidence 
about the legal consequences of their actions.”). 
 155. See U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. McKeithen, 226 F.3d 412, 418 (5th Cir. 2000) 
(“Retroactive legislation, as opposed to the prospective kind, can present more severe 
problems of unfairness because it can upset legitimate expectations and settled 
transactions.”). 
 156. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 266 (“The Legislature’s unmatched powers allow it to sweep 
away settled expectations suddenly and without individualized consideration.  Its 
responsivity to political pressures poses a risk that it may be tempted to use retroactive 
legislation as a means of retribution against unpopular groups or individuals.”). 
 157. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 316 (2001). 
 158. United States v. St. Louis, S.F. & Tex. Ry. Co., 270 U.S. 1, 3 (1926) (“That a statute 
shall not be given retroactive effect unless such construction is required by explicit language 
or by necessary implication is a rule of general application.”). 
 159. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 328 & n.4 (1997) (“[C]ases where this Court has 
found truly ‘retroactive’ effect adequately authorized by a statute have involved statutory 
language that was so clear that it could sustain only one interpretation.”); Arevalo v. 
Ashcroft, 344 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2003) (“[A]s a general rule, the benchmark for finding 
unambiguous temporal scope is quite high.”). 
 160. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 272–73 (“Requiring clear intent assures that Congress itself 
has affirmatively considered the potential unfairness of retroactive application and 
determined that it is an acceptable price to pay for the countervailing benefits.”). 
 161. 511 U.S. 244 (1994). 
 162. Id. at 280. 
 163. Id. 
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retroactive provisions but mitigates the unfairness of retroactivity by 
requiring Congress to be clear about its intentions.164 
The second prong of the Landgraf test recognizes that statutes may still 
have damaging retroactive effects even when Congress has not delineated 
their reach.  The second prong therefore prescribes a standard for 
determining when such effects justify limiting the statute’s application.165 
To craft the standard, the Court pulled language from an opinion written 
in 1814 by Justice Story, sitting on the circuit court in the District of New 
Hampshire.166  Justice Story found that there were two categories of statutes 
that had retroactive effects:  those that “take[] away or impair[] vested 
rights acquired under existing laws,” and those that “create[] a new 
obligation, impose[] a new duty, or attach[] a new disability, in respect to 
transactions or considerations already past.”167  While the distinction 
between these categories is somewhat vague,168 Justice Story made clear 
that courts should examine both the change in the law itself, and the 
relationship between the operation of that change and “a relevant past 
event.”169 
In adopting Justice Story’s categories, the Court noted that any test it 
imposed was unlikely to provide perfect guidance on when a statute has 
impermissible retroactive effects.170  However, the Court felt that “familiar 
considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled expectations,” 
as well as judges’ “sound . . . instinct[s]” in the area of retroactivity would 
provide them with the supplemental guidance they needed to reach a fair 
result.171 
C.   Retroactivity and Immigration in the Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court confronted the retroactivity of IIRIRA for the first 
time in INS v. St. Cyr.172  The case raised an important question of whether 
aliens should face post-hoc consequences imposed by IIRIRA for things 
they had done prior to its enactment.173 
St. Cyr dealt with a significant provision of the INA that removed the 
opportunity to apply for discretionary relief that, prior to IIRIRA, was 
generally available to immigrants facing deportation.  In the case, Enrico St. 
Cyr took a plea agreement and pled guilty to selling a controlled 
substance.174  Under the laws existing prior to IIRIRA, St. Cyr would have 
been able to apply for a discretionary waiver of his deportation under 
 
 164. Id. at 268. 
 165. Id. at 280. 
 166. Id. at 268. 
 167. Id. at 269. 
 168. This ambiguity has arguably allowed courts more flexibility in finding that a statute 
has retroactive effects, thereby circumscribing its scope. See infra Part IV.D–E. 
 169. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 270. 
 170. Id. at 276. 
 171. Id. at 270 (citing Danforth v. Groton Water Co., 59 N.E. 1033, 1034 (Mass. 1901)). 
 172. 533 U.S. 289 (2001). 
 173. Id. at 293. 
 174. Id. 
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section 212(c) of the INA.175  However, IIRIRA amended another section 
of the INA, 304(b), narrowing the class of individuals eligible for section 
212(c) waivers.176  The newly amended section excluded anyone convicted 
of any aggravated felony,177 and if applied to St. Cyr, it would have denied 
him the opportunity to apply for such relief. 
The Court looked to the test established in Landgraf and held that, per 
the first prong, Congress had not commanded with “requisite clarity” that 
IIRIRA should be applied retroactively.178  In doing so, the Court 
emphasized that the standard in Landgraf’s first prong is a demanding one 
and that retroactive effect authorized by statute must “involve[] statutory 
language that [i]s so clear that it could sustain only one interpretation.”179 
The Court then rejected arguments that IIRIRA’s comprehensiveness, 
date of enactment, or savings clause indicated Congress’s intentions that it 
be retroactive.180  The Court also found that Congress had explicitly 
indicated that other sections of IIRIRA were to apply retroactively, so its 
failure to do so with regard to section 304(b) rendered the legislature’s 
intent ambiguous at best.181  Accordingly, it found that Congress had not 
clearly indicated that the section was to be retroactively applied.182 
Turning to the second prong of the Landgraf test, the Court looked to 
Justice Story’s categories of retroactivity and found that section 304(b) fell 
under the second category:  “IIRIRA’s elimination of any possibility of . . . 
relief for people who entered into plea agreements with the expectation that 
they would be eligible for such relief clearly ‘attaches a new disability, in 
respect to transactions or considerations already past.’”183 
In an effort to follow “Landgraf’s common-sense, functional retroactivity 
analysis,”184 the Court was diligent in examining the precise nature of the 
past transaction in question and the expectations of relief that may have 
accompanied it.  The Court emphasized criminal defendants’ knowledge 
and consideration of the “immigration consequences of their convictions” 
when considering plea deals, citing state laws that require trial judges to 
explain such consequences when discussing plea deals,185 statistics on the 
frequency that immigration relief was granted prior to IIRIRA’s 
 
 175. Id. at 295. 
 176. Id. at 314. 
 177. Id. at 297. 
 178. Id. at 316. 
 179. Id. at 317 (quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 328 n.4 (1997)). 
 180. Id. at 317. 
 181. Id. at 318–19. 
 182. Id. at 320 (“The presumption against retroactive application of ambiguous statutory 
provisions, buttressed by ‘the longstanding principle of construing any lingering ambiguities 
in deportation statutes in favor of the alien,’ forecloses the conclusion that, in enacting 
§ 304(b), ‘Congress itself has affirmatively considered the potential unfairness of retroactive 
application and determined that it is an acceptable price to pay for the countervailing 
benefits.’” (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 272–73 (1994))). 
 183. Id. at 321 (citations omitted) (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 269). 
 184. Id. at 324. 
 185. Id. at 322 n.48. 
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enactment,186 as well as individual cases in which defendants negotiated 
deals in return for immigration relief.187  In light of these factors the Court 
was convinced that denying defendants a form of relief that they had 
effectively bargained for by taking a plea deal equated to the impermissible 
attachment of a new consequence for a past action.188  Therefore, the Court 
determined that section 304(b) was impermissibly retroactive.189 
The result of the decision was to restrain IIRIRA’s scope, despite the 
government’s arguments that the statute should be applied.  Although the 
decision was limited to only one of IIRIRA’s provisions, its impact was 
profound because it preserved an important and oft-used form of relief for 
those whose actions took place before IIRIRA was enacted.  Between 1989 
and 1996, 51.5 percent of all applications for 212(c) relief were granted, 
and over 10,000 immigrants received some kind of waiver grant during that 
period.190  While IIRIRA did away with 212(c) relief, St. Cyr preserved that 
avenue for those who had acted before the statute became effective. 
St. Cyr guided the circuit courts that began to hear challenges to the 
retroactive application of other provisions of IIRIRA.  However, each 
section of the INA that was changed by IIRIRA still required an 
independent assessment under Landgraf, and while St. Cyr provided clues 
about how to apply the test, it did not dictate a result in other cases on the 
statute’s retroactive reach.  When the circuit courts considered the temporal 
scope of the illegal reentry provision under section 241(a)(5), a split quickly 
developed as the courts used Landgraf to differing results.  This split was 
the subject of the Court’s next big IIRIRA decision, Fernandez-Vargas v. 
Gonzales. 
In Fernandez-Vargas, the Court again looked to the Landgraf test, but 
unlike in St. Cyr, the result of the case was to expand the reach of IIRIRA 
rather than to limit it.  Humberto Fernandez-Vargas was a Mexican citizen 
who had first entered the United States in the 1970s.191  He was 
subsequently deported, but he continued to reenter the country illegally on 
multiple occasions, with his last illegal entry taking place in 1982.192  
Thereafter, Fernandez-Vargas started a business, had a son in 1989, and 
married his wife in 2001.193  His wife filed a relative visa petition on his 
behalf, and he then filed for an adjustment of status in order to become a 
lawful permanent resident.194  Unfortunately, his application notified the 
government that Fernandez-Vargas was in the country illegally, and 
immigration officials moved to reinstate his prior deportation order from 
twenty years earlier.195 
 
 186. Id. at 323. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. See Asseff, supra note 21, at 174. 
 191. Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30, 35 (2006). 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
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Fernandez-Vargas resolved a split in the circuit courts as to whether 
Congress had intended section 241(a)(5) to apply to aliens who reentered 
the country prior to IIRIRA’s effective date.196  Once again, the Court used 
the Landgraf test and, under the first prong, began by determining whether 
Congress had addressed the provision’s reach.197  However, unlike in St. 
Cyr, the Court emphasized not the need for clear statements of intent, but 
rather the proposition that “normal rules of construction” may be used in an 
attempt to “draw a comparably firm conclusion about the temporal reach [of 
a law]” in the absence of explicit language from Congress.198 
Despite the absence of any statutory language delineating its temporal 
reach in relation to IIRIRA’s effective date, the Court found that Congress 
had likely intended that section 241(a)(5) should continue to be 
retroactively applied.199 
The Court found Fernandez-Vargas’s arguments about the omission of 
explicit retroactive language unpersuasive, explained that such a reading 
would lead to an absurd result,200 and ultimately ruled that “[c]ommon 
principles of statutory interpretation fail to unsettle the apparent application 
of § 241(a)(5) to any reentrant present in the country, whatever the date of 
return.”201  Accordingly, the decision abrogated holdings by those circuits 
that had held that section 241(a)(5) could never be retroactively applied.202 
The Court then turned to the second prong of the Landgraf test to 
determine whether the section amended by IIRIRA would effectively alter 
the rights, liabilities, or duties of a party after the fact.203  The Court 
focused on the fact that Fernandez-Vargas did not apply for any of the 
discretionary forms of relief available to him prior to the effective date of 
IIRIRA.204 
The Court determined that Fernandez-Vargas’s lack of action was fatal to 
his claim that the statute had retroactive effects under either of the 
traditional categories.  First, the right to apply for such discretionary relief 
was not a “vested right” (the first of Justice Story’s categories).205  
Fernandez-Vargas claimed that the application of section 241(a)(5) 
deprived him of potential avenues of relief that would have been previously 
available to him, such as cancellation of removal, adjustment of status, and 
voluntary departure.206  However, because he had not actually applied for 
 
 196. Id. at 36. 
 197. Id. at 37. 
 198. Id. (quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326 (1997)). 
 199. Id. at 38. 
 200. Id. at 40 (“[I]t would make no sense to infer that Congress meant to except the broad 
class of persons who had departed before the time of enactment but who might return 
illegally at some point in the future.”). 
 201. Id. at 41–42. 
 202. See Bejjani v. INS, 271 F.3d 670 (6th Cir. 2001), abrogated by Fernandez-Vargas, 
548 U.S. 30; Castro-Cortez v. INS, 239 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2001), abrogated by Fernandez-
Vargas, 548 U.S. 30. 
 203. Fernandez-Vargas, 548 U.S. at 44. 
 204. Id. at 44 n.10. 
 205. Id. at 44. 
 206. Id. 
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such relief, the Court described his perceived losses as “inchoate 
expectations and unrealized opportunities,” which on their own occupied 
nothing higher than the “level of hope.”207 
In St. Cyr, the Court had been convinced that the petitioning immigrant 
had an expectation of relief that was subsequently taken away.  However, in 
that case the Court was able to point to more concrete evidence of both St. 
Cyr’s knowledge of the relief at stake and the action he took in reliance on 
that expectation of relief.208  In contrast, the Court found that the relief 
Fernandez-Vargas sought had always been far less guaranteed and far less 
expected.  Furthermore, Fernandez-Vargas’s opportunity to receive relief 
was contingent on him taking affirmative steps to realize it, and he had not 
taken any action comparable to St. Cyr’s acceptance of a plea deal.209  As 
such, the Court held that the mere potential for relief was not a vested 
right.210 
Second, because Fernandez-Vargas had not been deprived of a vested 
right, the Court looked to whether application of the statute “create[d] a 
new obligation, impose[d] a new duty, or attache[d] a new disability, in 
respect to transactions or considerations already past.”211  Importantly, the 
Court did not consider Fernandez-Vargas’s reentry into the United States as 
a past “transaction[] or consideration[]” to which IIRIRA attached new 
disabilities.212  Because Fernandez-Vargas had not taken any action (such 
as applying to adjust his legal status) prior to IIRIRA’s date of enactment, 
the “transaction[] or consideration[]” to be considered was merely his 
continued presence in the country.213 
It is therefore the alien’s choice to continue his illegal presence, after 
illegal reentry and after the effective date of the new law, that subjects 
him to the new and less generous legal regime, not a past act that he is 
helpless to undo up to the moment the Government finds him out.214 
By considering an alien’s continued presence, and not his or her reentry 
into the United States, the conduct that triggered the application of 
IIRIRA’s reinstatement provisions, the Court allowed the provisions to be 
applied to the entire class of aliens who illegally reentered prior to IIRIRA 
 
 207. Id. 
 208. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 322–23 (2001) (“There can be little doubt that, as a 
general matter, alien defendants considering whether to enter into a plea agreement are 
acutely aware of the immigration consequences of their convictions. . . .  Given the 
frequency with which § 212(c) relief was granted in the years leading up to . . . IIRIRA, 
preserving the possibility of such relief would have been one of the principal benefits sought 
by defendants deciding whether to accept a plea offer or instead to proceed to trial.”). 
 209. Fernandez-Vargas, 548 U.S. at 44 n.10. 
 210. Id. (“These putative claims to relief are not ‘vested rights,’ a term that describes 
something more substantial than inchoate expectations and unrealized opportunities.”). 
 211. Id. at 37 (citing Soc’y for the Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler, 22 F. Cas. 756 
(C.C.D.N.H. 1814)). 
 212. Id. at 44. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. 
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but who did not take any action to avail themselves of the discretionary 
relief available pre-IIRIRA.215 
However, the Court was silent on whether the statute may be 
retroactively applied to an alien who illegally reentered prior to the 
effective date of IIRIRA and who had applied for an adjustment of status 
prior to the effective date of IIRIRA.216 
Nevertheless, many of the circuit courts had already considered this 
question several years before Fernandez-Vargas was decided, and the 
circuits seem to have reached a consensus that would temper the expansion 
of IIRIRA’s application seen in the Supreme Court’s ruling.217 
D.   Cases Involving Pre-IIRIRA Applications for Relief 
The First, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits all found that where an 
alien had reentered the United States, applied for and received a visa, and 
then applied for an adjustment of status, section 241(a)(5) could not be 
applied retroactively consistent with constitutional principles.218  
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit found the situation in which an alien applied 
for asylum prior to the effective date of IIRIRA to be analogous to the other 
circuits’ treatment of adjustment of status cases.219 
Before reviewing the cases, it is necessary to explain the procedural 
mechanisms they involve.  In particular, the cases below examine situations 
in which an immigrant has applied for (or failed to apply for) an adjustment 
of status.  Applying for an adjustment of status is a multistep process.220  
Prior to applying for the adjustment of status itself, aliens must first 
establish a basis for immigration and file a petition for a visa, or—more 
often—have a petition filed on their behalf by a sponsor.221  Immigrant 
petitions can be filed on the basis of the relation to a citizen or lawful 
permanent resident, through employment, humanitarian programs, as well 
as for a few other special classes of immigrants.222  The majority of the 
cases discussed below involve situations in which an alien’s family member 
or spouse filed an immigrant relative visa petition.  If a petition is approved, 
the alien must then wait for a visa to become available, at which point he or 
she will then be prima facie eligible for an adjustment of status.223  After 
 
 215. Id. at 47. 
 216. Id. at 36 n.5. 
 217. See infra Part IV.D–E. 
 218. Valdez-Sanchez v. Gonzales, 485 F.3d 1084 (10th Cir. 2007); Faiz-Mohammad v. 
Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 799 (7th Cir. 2005); Sarmiento Cisneros v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 381 F.3d 
1277 (11th Cir. 2004); Arevalo v. Ashcroft, 344 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2003). 
 219. Ixcot v. Holder, 646 F.3d 1202, 1213 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 220. Adjustment of Status, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. CITIZENSHIP & 
IMMIGRATION SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/green-card/green-card-processes-and-
procedures/adjustment-status (last updated Mar. 30, 2011). 
 221. Id. 
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 223. Silva Rosa v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d 403, 406–07 (5th Cir. 2007). 
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the alien then applies for adjustment of status, the Attorney General decides 
whether or not to grant the request.224 
1.   Arevalo v. Ashcroft 
The First Circuit was the first appellate court to deal with the situation in 
which an alien who was deported subsequently reentered the country and 
filed for an adjustment of status prior to the effective date of IIRIRA.  The 
First Circuit reached its decision three years prior to the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Fernandez-Vargas. 
In Arevalo v. Ashcroft,225 the petitioner illegally reentered the United 
States in 1990, after which she successfully received an employment 
authorization card (known as a green card).226  In 1996, she applied for an 
adjustment of status to become a legal permanent resident.227  Arevalo’s 
adjustment of status application was summarily denied and, pursuant to the 
changes implemented under IIRIRA, the previous order of deportation was 
reinstated without the opportunity for a hearing before an immigration 
judge or the opportunity to apply for discretionary relief.228 
After applying the first prong of the Landgraf test and determining that 
“Congress failed to specify the temporal reach of the INA’s reinstatement 
provision,”229 the court examined whether section 241(a)(5) had 
impermissibly retroactive effects.230  The court first determined that 
Arevalo was not challenging the right to a new deportation hearing, which 
had been available prior to IIRIRA, and held that, at any rate, such a right 
was subject to retroactive revocation because it was merely procedural—
i.e., there is no right in a particular forum or to a particular mode of 
relief.231  However, the First Circuit found that Arevalo’s overarching right 
to seek relief at all was a “substantive right.”232 
The court then expressed a number of points in dicta that would prove 
important in subsequent decisions.  First, the court emphasized the 
importance of Arevalo’s action in filing for relief prior to IIRIRA’s 
effective date.233  The court reasoned that because she had filed prior to the 
Act, retroactively disregarding her application pursuant to IIRIRA’s 
amendments to the INA would be unfair because it (1) “would deprive her 
both of a right that she once had,” and (2) would deprive her of “the 
 
 224. Id. at 407. 
 225. 344 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2003). 
 226. Id. at 6. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. at 13.  Because Arevalo was pre-Fernandez-Vargas, the First Circuit had to 
consider both prongs of the Landgraf test. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. at 14.  In making this determination the court relied on prior case law from the 
First Circuit as well as, by analogy, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Hughes Aircraft, “stating 
that changes in whether a claim may be brought at all affect substantive rights.” Id. (citing 
Hughes Aircraft v. United States, 520 U.S. 939, 951 (1997)). 
 233. Arevalo, 344 F.3d at 15. 
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reasonable expectation that she would have the opportunity to convince the 
Attorney General to grant her relief.”234 
In other words, the First Circuit found that the alien’s claims fell within 
the first of Justice Story’s categories of retroactivity involving the 
cancellation of vested rights,235 as opposed to the second category (new 
cancellation of vested rights), which occupied most of the Court’s analysis 
in Fernandez-Vargas.236 
The Arevalo court made clear that it found “[the] right to seek relief [to 
be] analytically separate and distinct from [the] right to the relief itself.”237  
Accordingly, the court held that it was immaterial that the type of relief that 
Arevalo sought (an adjustment of status) was a discretionary form of 
relief.238  Here, the Arevalo court drew on the Supreme Court’s decision in 
St. Cyr.239  Specifically, the Arevalo court cited St. Cyr’s assertion that 
“there is a clear difference . . . between facing possible deportation and 
facing certain deportation.”240  As such, Arevalo’s right to discretionary 
relief had vested upon her application for adjustment of status.241 
In the years following Arevalo, the circuit courts that confronted the 
same question would largely replicate and cite to the reasoning laid out in 
Arevalo in making their own determinations.  They also followed and 
heavily cited the logic and holding from St. Cyr, which remained the only 
guidepost from the Supreme Court for conducting the Landgraf test until 
Fernandez-Vargas.  However, their formulations of why IIRIRA’s 
application was impermissible differ in subtle ways. 
2.   Sarmiento Cisneros v. U.S. Attorney General 
The Eleventh Circuit was the next circuit to address the retroactivity of 
section 241(a)(5) in Sarmiento Cisneros v. U.S. Attorney General,242  and 
following Arevalo’s rationale, the court ultimately reached the same 
conclusion.  Jose Angel Sarmiento Cisneros illegally reentered the United 
States, married a U.S. citizen, received a visa (based on a spousal petition 
filed by his wife), and applied for and received an adjustment of status prior 
to the effective date of IIRIRA.243  The court found that, were the statute to 
bar the application, it would have an impermissibly retroactive effect as 
applied to Sarmiento; however, interestingly, the court chose to couch the 
unfair retroactive effect of the statute not in terms of impairing a vested 
right (as in Arevalo), but rather as the attachment of a “new disability to a 
completed transaction.”244 
 
 234. Id. 
 235. See supra notes 166–69 and accompanying text. 
 236. Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30, 44 n.10 (2006). 
 237. Arevalo, 344 F.3d at 15. 
 238. Id. 
 239. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 325 (2001). 
 240. Arevalo, 344 F.3d at 15 (quoting St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 325). 
 241. Id. 
 242. 381 F.3d 1277, 1284–85 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 243. Id. at 1279. 
 244. Id. at 1284. 
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Like the First Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit drew on the “possible 
deportation” versus “certain deportation” language from St. Cyr,245 as well 
as the First Circuit’s statement that “applications for discretionary relief, 
once made, often become a source of expectation and even reliance.”246  
However, rather than concluding that the reliance and expectations created 
when an alien applies for adjustment of status vest a substantive right, the 
court reasoned that the deprivation of that wholly discretionary relief is a 
new disability that attaches to the past conduct of those applying for it.247 
In other words, the First Circuit considered the pre-IIRIRA application 
for adjustment of status to constitute a vested right and applying IIRIRA 
would impermissibly destroy that right; the Eleventh Circuit considered the 
pre-IIRIRA application for adjustment of status to constitute a past 
transaction and applying IIRIRA would impermissibly attach new 
disabilities to that past transaction. 
3.   Faiz-Mohammad v. Ashcroft 
Khalid Faiz-Mohammad was another alien who illegally reentered, 
married a U.S. citizen, and filed a petition for alien relative, as well as an 
application for adjustment of status, prior to IIRIRA’s effective date.  In 
Faiz-Mohammad v. Ashcroft,248  the Seventh Circuit found the language of 
both Arevalo and Sarmiento Cisneros compelling, and further conflated (or 
integrated, depending on one’s perspective) Justice Story’s two categories 
as it reasoned that IIRIRA’s application was impermissibly retroactive.  The 
court held that preventing aliens from applying for discretionary relief was 
a “‘new disability’ that did not exist prior to IIRIRA’s passage” 
(implicating the second category of retroactivity) and that “[c]onsequently, 
because § 1231(a)(5) operates to ‘impair rights [Faiz-Mohammad] 
possessed when he acted,’ namely his ability to apply for discretionary 
relief, § 1231(a)(5) may not be applied retroactively to Mr. Faiz-
Mohammad” (implicating the first category of retroactivity).249 
4.   Valdez-Sanchez v. Gonzales 
The Tenth Circuit was the first to confront the issue post-Fernandez-
Vargas, and interestingly, the court did not find the Supreme Court’s ruling 
to be an impediment to ruling in favor of the foreign national.  In 2007, the 
Tenth Circuit decided Valdez-Sanchez v. Gonzales,250  and the opinion in 
the case summarized Faiz-Mohammad, Arevalo, and Sarmiento Cisneros in 
the lead up to the court’s decision.251 
 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. at 1285 (quoting Arevalo, 344 F.3d at 15). 
 247. Id. 
 248. Faiz-Mohammad v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 799, 800–01 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 249. Id. at 810 (citing Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994) (alteration 
in original)). 
 250. Valdez-Sanchez v. Gonzales, 485 F.3d 1084 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 251. Id. at 1089–91. 
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The Tenth Circuit chose to frame its decision in terms of the second of 
Justice Story’s categories.252  The court found that IIRIRA eliminated the 
possibility of relief previously available and, as such, a new disability 
“attached to a completed transaction because Petitioner had applied for 
relief prior to IIRIRA’s enactment.”253  The Tenth Circuit had little trouble 
distinguishing the case from Fernandez-Vargas, because the petitioner in 
Valdez-Sanchez had applied for and received an adjustment of status prior 
to IIRIRA’s effective date, taking the precise steps that the Supreme Court 
had noted might have changed the equation in Fernandez-Vargas’s case.254 
5.   Ixcot v. Holder 
In Ixcot v. Holder,255  the Ninth Circuit also addressed the situation in 
which an alien who had been subject to a final deportation order illegally 
reentered the United States and applied for a form of relief prior to the 
effective date of IIRIRA.256  The only difference between Ixcot and the 
cases described above is that the alien applied for asylum rather than 
adjustment of status.257 
In assessing Ixcot’s claims for retroactivity, the Ninth Circuit started by 
looking at Fernandez-Vargas, emphasizing the Court’s focus on the fact 
that Fernandez-Vargas had not applied for any relief prior to IIRIRA’s 
effective date and looking to the Court’s dicta about what Fernandez-
Vargas might have done.258  Acknowledging that the Supreme Court had 
left open the question of whether having applied for relief before IIRIRA 
made its application impermissibly retroactive, the Ninth Circuit then 
looked to the history of cases in the other circuits. 
Relying on Arevalo, Sarmiento-Cisneros, Faiz-Mohammed, and Valdez-
Sanchez,259 the court concluded that “the most salient fact . . . is whether an 
alien filed for relief before IIRIRA’s effective date and was awaiting the 
adjudication of that pending application when the government sought to 
reinstate an order of deportation under IIRIRA’s reinstatement 
provision.”260  The Ninth Circuit held that 
[the] difference [between an application for asylum and one for 
adjustment of status] is immaterial, because the central inquiry under 
Landgraf and St. Cyr is not the particular form of relief sought, nor 
whether that form of relief is discretionary, but whether the application of 
 
 252. Id. at 1090–91. 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. at 1089. 
 255. 646 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 256. Id. at 1203–05. 
 257. Id. at 1204. 
 258. Id. at 1209–10; see Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30, 46 (2006) 
(“[Fernandez-Vargas] could have married the mother of his son and applied for adjustment 
of status during that period, in which case he would at least have had a claim (about which 
we express no opinion) that proven reliance on the old law should be honored by applying 
the presumption against retroactivity.”). 
 259. Ixcot, 646 F.3d at 1210–12. 
 260. Id. at 1212. 
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a new statute “would impair rights a party possessed when he acted, 
increase a party’s liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with 
respect to transactions already completed.”261 
It is difficult to determine whether the Ninth Circuit considered IIRIRA’s 
application to be impermissible under the first, second, or both of Justice 
Story’s categories of retroactivity, because the court was never explicit in 
exactly what it considered to be happening in Ixcot’s case. 
The court merely stated that “IIRIRA’s new reinstatement provision 
dramatically expanded the scope of reinstatement while simultaneously 
barring individuals subject to reinstatement from virtually every form of 
immigration relief,” and that therefore because Ixcot had applied for asylum 
prior to the statute’s enactment, it could not be retroactively applied to 
him.262 
The language seems to suggest that both categories are applicable.  
Because IIRIRA’s expanded reinstatement provision subjected the asylum 
seeker to deportation proceedings, which he would not have been subjected 
to prior to the law’s enactment,263 the court seemed to indicate that IIRIRA 
attached a new disability (the second category) to his conduct of applying 
for asylum.  But the other effect of IIRIRA was to “simultaneously bar[] 
[him] from virtually every form of immigration relief,” which sounds more 
like being denied a right to discretionary relief that vested when he applied 
for asylum.264 
E.   Cases Lacking Pre-IIRIRA Applications for Relief 
Although a number of circuits have not ruled on the precise question of 
whether IIRIRA can be read retroactively in cases of illegal reentry, most 
circuits have ruled on the retroactivity of IIRIRA in one context or another, 
and those cases support a growing consensus that conduct short of applying 
for discretionary relief before the statute’s effective date will not prevent it 
from being retroactively applied.265  Nevertheless, because they are not 
directly on point, they require a more abridged analysis than the cases 
discussed in the previous section. 
Several of the circuits have addressed the situation in which an 
immigrant had reentered the United States and then married a U.S. citizen 
or legal resident prior to IIRIRA’s effective date.  Both the Second and 
Fourth Circuits held that IIRIRA could be applied in this situation, 
reasoning that marriage did not constitute the kind of past conduct to which 
to legal consequences would attach post-IIRIRA.266 
 
 261. Id. at 1213 (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994)). 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. at 1210. 
 264. Id. at 1213. 
 265. See supra Part IV.D–E. 
 266. Herrera-Molina v. Holder, 597 F.3d 128, 137 (2d Cir. 2010) (concluding that having 
married a U.S. citizen without having also applied for an adjustment of status was not 
enough to constitute “prior, completed conduct” that would prejudice the alien if section 
241(a)(5) was applied); Velasquez-Gabriel v. Crocetti, 263 F.3d 110 (4th Cir. 2001) 
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In 2002, the Eighth Circuit initially held that IIRIRA could not be applied 
in this situation, as the elimination of the ability to apply for relief 
constituted a new legal consequence to events completed prior to its 
enactment.267  However, the decision did not focus on the alien’s marriage 
as the past conduct, and in fact did not clarify which past conduct the new 
consequence was attaching to.  The court merely noted that section 
241(a)(5)’s denial of the right to apply for relief constituted the “elimination 
of a substantive defense,” which was per se a new legal consequence.268  
However, when confronted with the same situation four years later, the 
court held that Fernandez-Vargas had overruled the reasoning in Alvarez-
Portillo v. Ashcroft and therefore found that section 241(a)(5) was not 
impermissibly retroactive.269 
In Silva Rosa v. Gonzales,270 the alien had not only illegally reentered the 
United States and married a permanent resident pre-IIRIRA, but his wife 
had also filed an immigrant relative visa petition on his behalf.271  The visa 
was approved but not yet available to him prior to IIRIRA’s effective 
date.272  Silva Rosa’s visa became available post-IIRIRA, and he was then 
able to file for an adjustment of status.273  However, because he was not 
able to take the last step of applying for an adjustment of status prior to 
IIRIRA, his claim of impermissible retroactivity failed.  The court ruled that 
the combination of his marriage to a permanent resident and an unapproved 
immigrant relative visa petition was not enough to constitute a “vested 
right” or “settled expectation.”274  Noting that other circuits had deemed the 
application for an adjustment of status as a “completed transaction,” the 
court held that the steps Silva Rosa took fell short of what was required.275  
Accordingly, because Silva Rosa came after Fernandez-Vargas, the Fifth 
Circuit was compelled to find that lacking such a completed transaction, 
“IIRIRA does not impermissibly attach new consequences to . . . an illegal 
reentry.”276 
In Lopez-Flores v. Department of Homeland Security,277 the Eight 
Circuit heard the petition of an alien who had also reentered the United 
States and applied for a visa prior to IIRIRA.278  However, Lopez-Flores 
had applied for an Alien Employment Certification through his sponsoring 
 
(concluding that failure to apply to adjust resident status before the new law took effect 
ensured that the statute “attache[d] [no] new legal consequences to events completed before 
its enactment” (citation omitted)). 
 267. Alvarez-Portillo v. Ashcroft, 280 F.3d 858, 867 (8th Cir. 2002). 
 268. Id. 
 269. Gonzalez v. Chertoff, 454 F.3d 813, 814–18 & n.4 (8th Cir. 2006). 
 270. 490 F.3d 403 (5th Cir. 2007). 
 271. Id. at 405. 
 272. Id. 
 273. Id. 
 274. Id. at 406. 
 275. Id. at 408. 
 276. Id. at 409. 
 277. 387 F.3d 773 (8th Cir. 2004). 
 278. Id. at 775. 
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employer rather than for an immigrant relative visa petition.279  Lopez-
Flores’s application was not approved until after IIRIRA, and in 2002 he 
applied for adjustment of status, which was subsequently denied.280  
Following the rationale in Alvarez-Portillo, the court ruled that section 
241(a)(5) was impermissibly retroactive as applied to the alien.281  
Although the Supreme Court did not discuss Lopez-Flores in its decision in 
Fernandez-Vargas, the Tenth Circuit had distinguished the case in its 
opinion in the Fernandez-Vargas case, which the Supreme Court 
affirmed.282 
How should we reconcile the Court’s decision in Fernandez-Vargas283  
with the circuit courts’ decisions284  narrowly interpreting the reach of 
IIRIRA’s illegal reentry provision?  And putting aside Fernandez-Vargas’s 
contrary holding, how should we understand the Court’s increasingly 
nondeferential stance in immigration?285  The last part of this Note attempts 
to reconcile these seemingly contradictory decisions on the retroactivity of 
section 241(a)(5) and the contours of the Court’s more recent rulings in 
general. 
V.   IIRIRA’S RETROACTIVE ANALYSIS REFLECTS 
THE NORMALIZATION OF IMMIGRATION LAW 
A review of the cases presented above leads to two different 
observations.  The first has to do with the different outcomes seen in 
Fernandez-Vargas and the circuit court decisions.  The second, and more 
important, deals with the kind of analyses employed in the retroactivity 
cases as a whole, and how they compare to the broader arc of judicial 
review in immigration cases.  Part V takes each of these observations in 
turn and then concludes by explaining why they matter. 
A.   Fernandez-Vargas Versus the Circuits 
Upon first glance, the picture that emerges from the courts’ treatment of 
IIRIRA’s retroactivity is one in which the circuits have tempered the 
broader application of the immigration statute as applied in Fernandez-
Vargas.286  Under Fernandez-Vargas, immigrants who reentered the 
country prior to IIRIRA are still subjected to its harsher immigration 
regime, but under the circuit court decisions those who applied for an 
adjustment of status before the law went into effect remain entitled to the 
relief provided by the more forgiving system that predated it. 
 
 279. Id. 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id. 
 282. Fernandez-Vargas v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 881, 890 n.11 (10th Cir. 2005), aff’d sub 
nom. Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30 (2006). 
 283. See supra Part IV.C. 
 284. See supra Part IV.D–E. 
 285. See supra Part II. 
 286. See supra Part IV.D–E. 
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This result may seem absurd, but it is not necessarily the product of a 
conflict between the Supreme Court and the circuits.  In Fernandez-Vargas, 
the Supreme Court explicitly recognized the existence of many of the 
circuit cases discussed above and provided no indication that those 
decisions were wrongly decided.287  Nor can the cases properly be 
considered a reaction to Fernandez-Vargas, as many of them took place 
several years before it.288 
However, the mere fact that Fernandez-Vargas left open the question 
decided by the circuit cases, does not equate to an outright approval of the 
circuits’ decisions in those cases.  The Supreme Court could still find that 
section 241(a)(5) retroactively applies to aliens who applied for an 
adjustment of status prior to IIRIRA’s effective date, and indeed the spirit 
of the Court’s decision in Fernandez-Vargas may well support such a 
holding. 
Furthermore, the Court’s recognition of the circuits’ decisions on that 
question might indicate that the Court knew that its decision in Fernandez-
Vargas would be limited by the circuits’ interpretations.  The Court may 
have been more willing to expand the reach of IIRIRA because it knew that 
the expansion would still be limited to situations in which aliens had not 
taken significant affirmative steps to change their legal status before the 
statute went into effect.289 
On the other hand, if the result still seems half-baked, one answer may be 
just that the Court got it wrong.  The Court could have used Fernandez-
Vargas as an opportunity to interpret the scope of IIRIRA much more 
narrowly.  At either step of the Landgraf test, the Court could have found 
that the statute should not be retroactively applied, and in fact the way in 
which the Court applied the test seems at odds with the Court’s other 
decision on IIRIRA’s retroactivity in St. Cyr. 
The Court framed the inquiry of determining Congress’s intent with 
regard to the provisions of IIRIRA very differently in Fernandez-Vargas 
than it did in St. Cyr.  In St. Cyr, the Court stressed the demanding nature of 
the inquiry and the need for clear statutory language.290  Finding the section 
to be ambiguous, the St. Cyr Court invoked the “longstanding principle of 
construing any lingering ambiguities in deportation statutes in favor of the 
alien,” to support their finding that Congress had not addressed the scope of 
the statute.291 
In contrast to St. Cyr, in Fernandez-Vargas, the Court emphasized the 
use of ordinary tools of statutory interpretation during the first prong of the 
Landgraf test to determine congressional intent in the absence of a clear 
 
 287. Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30, 36 n.5, 46 (2006). 
 288. See Faiz-Mohammad v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 799 (7th Cir. 2005); Sarmiento Cisneros 
v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 381 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2004); Arevalo v. Ashcroft, 344 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 
2003). 
 289. See supra Part IV.C. 
 290. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 316–17 (2001) (quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 
320, 328 & n.4 (1997)). 
 291. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 320 (quoting INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 
(1987)). 
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statement.292  Additionally, unlike in St. Cyr, the Court did not invoke any 
rules that would have favored the petitioning alien, and they found the tools 
of interpretation that he used to be uncompelling.293  In particular, 
Fernandez-Vargas had cited the statutory interpretive rule of negative 
implication, arguing that the removal of language applying the 
reinstatement provision to immigrants who reentered prior to the statute’s 
effective date was evidence of congressional intent to change the law.294 
Critics note that as it dismissed Fernandez-Vargas’s arguments, the Court 
did not consider the legislative history of the provision in which Congress 
had considered and rejected an earlier draft of the statute that would have 
expressly called for the retroactive application of the provisions in section 
241(a)(5).295  Additionally, the presence of clear statements of retroactive 
reach elsewhere in IIRIRA and a look at the legislative intent behind the 
pre-IIRIRA version of the statute also suggest that Fernandez-Vargas’s 
interpretation might have more accurately reflected the law’s intended 
scope.296 
Commentators also have been critical of the Court’s application of the 
second prong of Landgraf.297  The Court could have found that the situation 
in Fernandez-Vargas was analogous to that in St. Cyr; indeed that was the 
argument made by Fernandez-Vargas.298  He argued that just as St. Cyr 
might not have taken the plea bargain in the absence of the relief eliminated 
by IIRIRA, so might he not have reentered and continued to live in the 
United States if it were not for the availability of discretionary relief that 
existed pre-IIRIRA.299 
The Court instead chose to shift the triggering conduct from Fernandez-
Vargas’s reentry to his presence in the country, allowing the Court to 
bypass the retroactive effects of the statute by finding that it was the alien’s 
failure to leave the country that subjected him to the new law’s stricter 
consequences.300  Arguably, this leads to the somewhat absurd result of 
arguing that an alien can escape the harsh reinstatement of removal to a 
country by moving there voluntarily.301 
Ultimately, there are no clear answers about what motivated the Court’s 
decision in Fernandez-Vargas or why the circuits have reached the 
consensus seen in their cases.  Undoubtedly the differing results of these 
cases are in large part attributable to the abstruse standards laid out by the 
 
 292. Fernandez-Vargas, 548 U.S. at 37 (quoting Lindh, 521 U.S. at 326). 
 293. Id. at 40. 
 294. Id. at 38. 
 295. See, e.g., Asseff, supra note 21, at 166. 
 296. Id. at 167. 
 297. Id. at 168. 
 298. Fernandez-Vargas, 548 U.S. at 40. 
 299. Id. at 39. 
 300. See Asseff, supra note 21, at 21. 
 301. Id. at 170.  Fernandez-Vargas sought to avoid having to return to live in Mexico, not 
merely to avoid the removal process itself.  “It is thus disingenuous for the Court to argue 
that Fernandez-Vargas could have improved his situation and avoided the new legal 
consequences of the IIRIRA by voluntarily returning to Mexico.” Id. 
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Landgraf test and Justice Story’s language.  At least one author argues that 
the ambiguity seen in the test for retroactivity necessitates the creation of a 
rule of lenity favoring noncitizens in immigration law.302 
However, the minutiae of the debate over whether Fernandez-Vargas 
was correctly decided or why the cases create such a trivial trigger for 
determining IIRIRA’s retroactive application tends to obscure a more 
important observation about how the courts are interpreting immigration 
law in general. 
B.   IIRIRA’s Retroactivity As Ordinary Statutory Interpretation 
The existence of the debate over Fernandez-Vargas itself shows that 
when it comes to assessing the retroactivity of section 241(a)(5), both the 
Supreme Court and the circuit courts reviewed IIRIRA in an active and 
involved manner.  Rather than deferring to the government’s interpretation 
of IIRIRA or providing overbroad readings of the statute in recognition of 
Congress’s plenary power in immigration, all of the courts used common 
interpretive tools to carefully apply the Landgraf test to the immigration 
statute.  Even the somewhat erratic use of Justice Story’s categories and the 
myriad arguments against the result in Fernandez-Vargas would seem to 
indicate that the courts are actively using the interpretive tools available to 
them, allowing them to find multiple paths to define the outer limits of 
IIRIRA’s application. 
In this way the cases on IIRIRA’s retroactivity are consistent with the 
Court’s more thorough review of the statute in general, as illustrated by the 
cases in Part III.  The picture that emerges from the Court’s treatment of 
IIRIRA is one that stands in sharp contrast to the worries espoused by 
commentators who feel that the Court has been overly deferential to other 
branches in immigration law.303  Far from being reluctant to fulfill its 
interpretive role, the Court has continually applied the substantive and 
interpretive tools it has in order to push back against the political branches 
when it comes to IIRIRA’s harsh changes to immigration law. 
One explanation for the more normalized statutory interpretation seen in 
the retroactivity cases is that it is merely the result of the Landgraf test’s 
formal framework for review.  When structured tests or doctrines from 
other areas of law are applied to the immigration context, they might offer 
the Court greater leverage to examine immigration statutes in a more 
ordinary and less deferential way.  The use of the Landgraf test in 
Fernandez-Vargas might then be comparable to the application of the equal 
protection framework discussed in Part II.  Applying the test amounted to a 
more thorough review of the statute, but ultimately the result of the case 
was less immigrant-friendly than might be expected. 
Nevertheless, the retroactivity cases’ consistency with the other 
nondeferential IIRIRA cases suggests that there is a larger trend toward 
reviewing immigration law in a more ordinary manner.  At least one 
 
 302. Id. at 175. 
 303. See supra Part II. 
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commentator has argued that in the last few years the Court has completely 
normalized its treatment of not only the IIRIRA cases but all immigration 
cases.  Professor Kevin R. Johnson examines the Court’s immigration 
decisions from 2009 to 2013 and concludes that the Court has 
“mainstreamed U.S. immigration law and slowly but surely moved away 
from anything that might be reasonably characterized as ‘immigration 
exceptionalism.’”304 
Professor Johnson details how the contemporary court has repeatedly 
rejected agency interpretations through the use of “standard, unremarkable 
[tools of] statutory interpretation.”305  It may then be that when viewed in 
the context of the Court’s recent decisions, the IIRIRA line of cases are but 
one example of the judiciary’s growing rejection of the long tradition of 
deference and exceptionalism in reviewing immigration laws. 
C.   Why Does It Matter? 
While in theory laws are to be interpreted and executed with regard to a 
single meaning,306 in practice the three branches of American government 
rarely agree on the application of the law.307  The legislators who write and 
pass a law hope that it conveys their intent regarding its application (to the 
extent that a single opinion can be evinced from a body of hundreds of 
legislators).308  The executive agencies that enforce the laws have their own 
interpretations of how the laws should be construed in practice, which may 
reflect the agencies’ own interests.309  The judiciary attempts to play the 
role of “faithful agent” to the legislature,310 but nonetheless may be 
influenced and motivated by its own particular institutional and historical 
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recognized the possibility that an agency may adopt a statutory or regulatory interpretation 
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perspectives,311 leaving it to express rulings that may or may not always be 
consistent with the intent or interpretations of the political branches.  
Therefore, when reviewing the application of a law, courts are confronted 
with a confluence of interests, further complicating the already fraught task 
of interpreting statutes that may be unclear, ambiguous, or overreaching.  
While courts may choose to ignore (properly or not) the background of 
interests and influences as they go about their business, they may yet find 
themselves confronting the basic choice of deferring to the interpretations 
that have been presented to them, or fashioning their own readings.312 
How much deference the courts should give to the other branches when 
reviewing their acts and decisions is one of the most fundamental and 
endlessly controversial issues in American jurisprudence.313  How that 
question is answered has important implications for the balance of power 
wielded by the different branches, the constitutional roles of each branch in 
governing, and the protection of individual liberties.314 
A nondeferential court that strictly polices the actions of the political 
branches may be seen as activist, unrepresentative, and frustratingly 
countermajoritarian.315  However, when a court is too deferential it may be 
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viewed as failing to fulfill its role in protecting constitutional rights from 
overreaches by the political branches and neglecting to play a more active 
part in protecting those groups which are vulnerable due to their lack of 
representation and political power.316 
Immigration law often has been considered to be an area in which the 
courts have been very deferential both to the executive branch (in the form 
of administrative agencies), to Congress, and even to state legislatures.317  
In some sense this may not be so surprising.  Immigration is a field in 
which Congress and the executive branch have traditionally held plenary 
power.318  Residence and citizenship can confer substantial rights and 
privileges, and therefore, the granting of these statuses should arguably be 
in the hands of the representative branches.319  Additionally, the sheer 
volume of immigrants, and the complexity of structures in place to handle 
immigration, may make it an area in which courts are ill-equipped to make 
decisions.320 
Nevertheless, the dangers of an overly deferential court are keenly felt in 
the immigration sphere.321  Immigrants, especially those who have entered 
the country illegally, are perhaps the group with the least ability to navigate 
the social and political systems in place to obtain political representation 
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from judicial control.”); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950). 
 319. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976). 
 320. See Legomsky, supra note 48, at 1629 (“When a court reverses a decision of an 
administrative agency, a body that lacks specialized expertise in the particular field is 
superseding a body that has such expertise.  In immigration law, where technical nuances 
abound, the value of expertise should not be discounted.”). 
 321. See Rana, supra note 41, at 345.  In many ways, the “history of immigration 
jurisprudence is a history of obsession with judicial deference” and one that continues, and 
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and Immigration Law, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1671, 1671 (2007)). 
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and secure their rights.322  Moreover, immigration has always been a highly 
politically charged matter, and unfortunately, xenophobia has long been a 
potent force in American politics, especially during times in which jobs and 
resources are scarce.323  Therefore, there is arguably a special need for the 
judiciary, which is, at least in theory, more removed from the political 
sphere, to play an active role in reviewing the actions of the other 
branches.324 
The need for a more vigilant judiciary is heightened by the political 
branches’ contemporary efforts to curb the courts’ role in immigration.325  
In 1996, IIRIRA drastically changed the “substance and structure of 
immigration law and proceedings . . . mak[ing] it [much] more difficult for 
noncitizens to obtain and keep legal status in the United States.”326  The 
years since IIRIRA’s passage are one of the “longest periods of time that 
have passed without significant immigration reform since the 1880s.”327  
The anti-immigrant nature of IIRIRA and the lack of meaningful reform 
since its passage, exaggerate the impact of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
interpretations of the statute’s scope.  It is perhaps heartening then to see 
that in interpreting IIRIRA, the courts have shied away from the old trends 
of deference and used the statutory tools at their disposal to engage in the 
meaningful review of a law that can have such a profound impact on the 
lives of so many immigrants. 
CONCLUSION 
Nearly twenty years after its passage, the Court continues to grapple with 
the scope of IIRIRA.  More surprising still is that among the biggest 
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questions presented by the law is when it can be applied to immigrants 
whose actions predate it. 
However, the decisions on the retroactivity of IIRIRA speak to more than 
just the individual actions of those caught up in its provisions; they are part 
of a broader discussion of the judiciary’s role in immigration and the 
courts’ responses to the political branches’ attempts to circumscribe the 
already limited judicial intervention available in immigration cases.  This 
Note adds to that broader understanding by examining one line of cases that 
show how the modern courts have chaffed at their historically deferential 
role in immigration law and pushed back at the strict legal regimes created 
by Congress and the broad interpretations of restrictive immigration laws 
advocated for by immigration agencies.  While the normalization of judicial 
review in immigration law does not always mean that the Court’s decisions 
will be immigrant-friendly, it does at least mean that the laws that affect 
immigrants will be subjected to the type of searching review that we expect 
from our judiciary. 
